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Abstract
In the absence of other effective trust systems, an agent’s reputation status becomes a critical
factor in online transactions. A higher reputation category may give sellers an advantage in
competition on online trading platforms. It is also possible that such reputation benefits provide
sufficient incentives for sellers to adjust their pricing behavior. We here propose a simple economic
model in which an online seller maximizes the sum of the profit from current sales and the possible
future gain from a targeted higher reputation level. We show that the model can predict a jump
in optimal pricing behavior. We adopt a quantile regression threshold model (QRTM) to identify
and explore such a pricing pattern as the “goodwill effect” in this paper. The use of a QRTM also
allows us to model the heterogeneous behavior of different online sellers. We apply the proposed
estimation and testing strategies to a data set obtained from Taobao.com, a leading online trading
platform in China. We find both heterogeneities and jumps in a seller’s goodwill pricing strategy
in our application.
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1 Introduction
The global connectivity of the Internet offers potential buyers and sellers unprecedented opportunities
to engage in arms-length transactions with distant partners. Our societies thus need to develop new
trust mechanisms that are capable of ensuring cooperation and efficiency in a universe of strangers.
Online reputation systems currently draw upon the Internet’s bi-directional communication capabilities
to engineer large-scale word-of-mouth networks in which individuals share opinions on and experiences
of a wide range of topics, including, of particular interest here, products and services. Empirical
studies have documented extensive evidence to show that sellers enjoy greater benefits from a better
reputation. See, for example, Bolton et al. (2004) and Resnick et al. (2006).
Although it is heartening to know that reputation confers rewards, it is also of interest to economists
to know whether a reputation system exerts any influence on a seller’s market behavior. The reputation
scoring mechanism has recently emerged as one of the most promising solutions to the problem of
trust-building on the Internet. Typically, a transaction party can obtain positive/negative or neutral
feedback from her trading partner, which, accordingly, adds/deducts one point or zero point to her total
reputation score.1 Buyers observe sellers’ reputation scores when searching for a potential transaction
partner. In this paper, we investigate whether and how a selling strategy may be affected by a
reputation system of this kind.
Taobao.com is a Chinese-language online shopping website similar to eBay. It facilitates business-
to-consumer and consumer-to-consumer retail by providing a platform for businesses and individual
entrepreneurs to open online retail stores that cater mainly to consumers in mainland China, Hong
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. Sellers are able to post both new and used goods for sale on the Taobao
marketplace, although the overwhelming majority of products is brand-new merchandise sold at a fixed
price.2 At the end of 2010, Taobao reported more than 370 million registered users and more than
800 million product listings. In 2010, the gross merchandise volume sold on Taobao.com was valued at
400 billion Chinese yuan (approximately US$61 billion), about ten times greater than the value sold
in 2007. In January 2011, Taobao.com ranked 13th overall in Alexa’s Internet traffic rankings.
Taobao.com exhibits an interesting phenomenon. When posting an item for sale, sellers sometimes
explicitly indicate that it is “on sale” for the purpose of striving for the next category of reputation.
It is this observation that motivates the study reported in this paper. We first provide an economic
model to explain the pricing strategy that a seller may adopt when the benefit from a better reputation
concerns the pricing decision. In our model, the seller maximizes the sum of the profit of current sales
and the possible future gain from a better reputation. We demonstrate that, at a certain threshold on
the reputation level, a seller may decide to undercut the current price in exchange for the future gain.
Such a pricing pattern entails a “jump” or “structural change” in the pricing rule. We therefore refer
to this pattern as “pricing for goodwill” in this paper.
In view of the presence of heterogeneous sellers in the market, we recognize that high-end sellers
1For example, eBay employs a version of this type of reputation mechanism in practice.
2Auctions are another selling mechanism on Taobao.com, although they account for a very small percentage of
transactions.
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may adopt completely different pricing strategies than middle- and low-end sellers. Indeed, Cabral
and Hortascu (2010) acknowledged the existence of significant unobservable seller heterogeneity in
the electronic market. Such heterogeneity motivates us to adopt a quantile regression model a la
Koenker and Bassett (1978) to investigate the jump behavior of pricing. It is well known that quantile
regressions are a flexible way to model the heterogeneous influences of explanatory variables on the
response variable of interest, which is the selling price here. To allow for possible structural breaks,
we extend the mean regression threshold model of Hansen (2000) and the median regression threshold
model of Caner (2002) to our quantile regression model, which we term the quantile regression threshold
model (QRTM hereafter). Based on the QRTM, we first test for the existence of a change (threshold)
point in pricing behavior, and we then consider the estimation of both the change point and the jump
size. When threshold points are detected at different quantile indices, it is also interesting to determine
whether they are the same. Therefore, we also develop an inferential method that allows us to test for
the existence of a common break and estimate the common change point and jump size.
We collected trading data for the iPod Nano from Taobao.com for the last four months of 2009,
to which we apply the proposed methodology. Our empirical results indicate that sellers at different
quantiles (of prices) exhibit quite different pricing behavior, although most of them employ a pricing
for goodwill strategy predicted in the model.
It is worth mentioning that, from the application perspective, this paper also subtly enriches the
empirical literature on the regression discontinuity design (RDD). In the typical RDD framework,
researchers are interested in the causal effect of a binary intervention or treatment. This design arises
frequently in studies of administrative decisions. The basic idea behind the RDD is that assignment
to a treatment group is determined by whether the value of a predictor (a covariate) lies on one side of
a fixed threshold. Then, any discontinuity in the conditional distribution of the outcome as a function
of the covariate at the cutoff value can serve as evidence for the causal effect of the treatment.3
At the heart of identifying assumptions to validate the RDD framework, the covariate is con-
nected with the potential outcomes in a continuous (smooth) way. However, it has gradually caught
practitioners’ attention that public knowledge of the treatment assignment rule may threaten such a
continuity assumption. Calling this the “manipulation problem,” McCrary (2008) pointed out that
“when the individuals know of the selection rule for treatment, are interested in being treated, and
have time to fully adjust their behavior accordingly,” the validity of the identification arguments in
the RDD approach may fail to hold. McCrary proposed a test for the discontinuity at the cutoff in
the density function of the covariate.4 This paper instead provides a complete picture of how agents
adjust their behavior when approaching the treatment threshold (if we consider the “next reputation
category” as a treatment). We contribute to the literature by documenting a scenario in which, at
individuals’ optimal behavior, another endogenous cutoff may occur in accordance with the incentive
to achieve an exogenous threshold for the treatment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an economic model to illustrate the
3Empirical applications of such a framework are abundant: see, Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a detailed survey.
4In a recent working paper, Bajari et al. (2010) investigated how a RDD estimation strategy can be modified to solve
the manipulation problem in a health care contract application.
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pricing pattern when goodwill is of concern. We then examine the testing and estimation strategies for
this pricing pattern in a QRTM framework in Section 3. The empirical application is investigated in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. All mathematical proofs are collected
in the appendix.
2 An Economic Model of Pricing for Goodwill
In this section, we present an economic model to investigate the pricing behavior of sellers when they
take the goodwill effect into account when making decisions.5
Consider a monopolist with current reputation status (score) r who is selling a product with zero
marginal cost.6 A one-shot demand is Q(p) = 1 − αp (for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/α, to guarantee non-negative
sales). Among the sales made, the seller can receive a number of good reviews. When accumulating
these good reviews to exceed a threshold r¯, the seller can receive an extra (exogenous) profit β. The
empirical literature has documented extensive evidence to show that sellers with a superior reputation
generate significantly higher profits. This β can be thought of as the discounted future profit from
operating with a better business reputation. Thus, the seller’s expected profit function is given by
Π(p; r) = Π1(p) + Π2(p; r)
= Π1(p) + β · Pr[R(p, e) ≥ (r¯ − r)],
where R(p, e) denotes the accrued good reviews from sales by charging a price p, and e is a random
factor that generates the randomness of Π2 for any given (p, r). Therefore, Π1 denotes the profit a
seller obtains from the market without any concerns over goodwill benefits, and Π2 is the expected
gain in extra profit from goodwill.
We further specify R(p, e) = 1 − αp − e. Note that in such a specification we implicitly assume
that more sales (from charging lower prices) tend to generate more good reviews. Moreover, e can be
understood as the part of the sales that incur bad reviews. Then, the probability of benefiting from
goodwill is
Pr[1− αp− e > r¯ − r] = F (1− αp− r¯ + r),
where F is the cumulative distribution function of e with density f , which is everywhere differentiable
on its domain [0, 1]. The seller’s profit function becomes
Π(p; r) = p(1− αp) + βF (1− αp− r¯ + r).
Taking the first-order derivative of Π with respect to p yields the first-order condition (FOC):
∂Π
∂p
(p; r) = (1− 2αp)− αβf(1− αp− r¯ + r) = 0. (2.1)
5We are greatly indebted to Wing Suen who inspired us to establish this economic model.
6The zero marginal cost assumption is innocuous. The monopoly assumption can be thought of as a simplification of
monopolistic competition, under which the firm’s demand is residual demand.
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It is worth noting that equation (2.1) implies, for any given r, that ∂Π∂p (p; r) < 0 if p ≥ 12α ≡ pm.
Therefore, the optimal price in the model must entail a price cut from pm if the concerns of goodwill
matter.
Beyond the price cut from pm at the optimum, we hope to generate a jump at a certain reputation
level as the pricing strategy for goodwill in the model equilibrium. To this end, we make the following
assumptions on the density function f . Let f ′ and f ′′ denote the first- and second-order derivatives of
f.
Assumption M1. There exists eˆ ∈ (0, 1] such that f(eˆ) < 1/(αβ) and f ′(eˆ) = 0. Moreover,
f ′(e) > 0 ∀ e < eˆ, and f ′(e) < 0 ∀ e > eˆ.
Assumption M2. There exists e˜ ∈ (0, eˆ) such that f ′(e˜) > 2/(αβ). Moreover, lime→0 f ′(e) <
2/(αβ).
Assumption M1 implies that f is a unimodal density function. The height restriction on f in
this assumption ensures that the first-order condition, equation (2.1), is equipped with a solution,
thereby effectively ruling out an uninteresting case in which the goodwill effect would dominate over
the current monopolistic pricing (and therefore the seller would charge zero price). Assumption M2
requires a special curvature on f to the left of its mode. This curvature induces increasing marginal
returns on a segment of Π, which implies that the profit function Π is not globally concave.7 Indeed, it
is this particular curvature that delivers the pricing strategy for goodwill in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose Assumptions M1 and M2 hold. Then the seller’s optimal pricing strategy
entails a regime change. That is, there exist a threshold of reputation γ0 and two different pricing
regimes p∗1(r) and p
∗
2(r) such that the seller’s optimal pricing rule p
∗(r) is
p∗(r) =
p∗1(r) if r ≤ γ0p∗2(r) if r > γ0 ,
where
∂p∗1(r)
∂r < 0.
Proof. Assumptions M1 and M2 together imply that there must exist two points E1, E2 ∈
(0, eˆ) such that f ′(E1) = f ′(E2) = 2/(αβ). Without loss of generality, we assume that E1 < E2, which
in turn implies that f(E1) < f(E2) by M1. Define v1 and v2 such that
1− 2αv1 − βαf(E1) = 0 and 1− 2αv2 − βαf(E2) = 0. (2.2)
Then, we must have v1 > v2. Further, we define r1 and r2 such that
1− αv1 − r¯ + r1 = E1 and 1− αv2 − r¯ + r2 = E2. (2.3)
7We can extend the model by allowing for more general curvatures on the tails of f . Our major findings on pricing
strategy in the model remain valid, but the extension unnecessarily complicates the analysis by introducing multiple
optimal solutions. Therefore, we decide to retain the most simplifying assumption for ease of exposition.
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Figure 1: Pricing Strategy When r ≤ r2
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Consider r1,
r1 = r¯ − 1 + αv1 + E1
= r¯ − 1 + α1− βαf(E1)
2α
+ E1
= r¯ − 1
2
− βαf(E1)
2
+ E1.
Analogously, r2 = r¯− 12− βαf(E2)2 +E2. Therefore, by the mean value theorem there exists e¨ ∈ (E1, E2)
such that
r1 − r2 = −βα
2
[f(E1)− f(E2)] + (E1 − E2)
= (E1 − E2)
[
1− βα
2
f ′(e¨)
]
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that f ′(e) > 2/(αβ) for any e ∈ (E1, E2) by M2.
Consequently we have shown that r1 > r2.
To understand the optimal pricing strategy in the model, we consider three cases: (1) r ≤ r2, (2)
r ≥ r1, and (3) r2 < r < r1.
Case 1. When r ≤ r2.
At r2, the point p = v2 makes the FOC in (2.1) hold by construction. Further,
∂2Π
∂p2 (v2; r2) = −2α +
α2βf ′ (E2) = 0 and p = v2 is an inflexion point on the graph Π (·; r2). Define p1(r2) = v2 + E2−E1α .
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Using (2.2), (2.3), and the fact that f ′ (E1) = 2/ (αβ) , we can readily verify that ∂Π∂p (p1(r2); r2) =
1−2αp1(r2)−αβf(E1) = 2(r1−r2) > 0 and ∂2Π∂p2 (p1(r2); r2) = −2α+α2βf ′ (E1) = 0. Therefore, p1(r2)
corresponds to a local maximum on the graph of ∂Π∂p (·; r2) and an inflexion point on the Π (·; r2) graph
by M2. As ∂Π∂p (p
m; r2) < 0, there must exist: p
∗
1 ∈ (p1(r2), pm) such that ∂Π∂p (p∗1; r2) = 0. Moreover, p∗1
is the unique maximum. (Refer to Figure 1.)
Extending to the case of r < r2, define two local extremes, v2(r) and p1(r) on the function
∂Π
∂p (·; r) with v2(r) < p1(r). By definition, ∂
2Π
∂p2 (v2(r); r) =
∂2Π
∂p2 (p1(r); r) = 0. It is easily veri-
fied that ∂Π∂p (v2; r) > 0,
∂Π
∂p (p1(r2); r) >
∂Π
∂p (p1(r2); r2) > 0,
∂2Π
∂p2 (p1(r2); r) < 0,
∂Π
∂p (p
∗
1; r) > 0, and
∂Π
∂p (v2 (r) ; r) >
∂Π
∂p (v2 (r) ; r2) > 0 ∀ r < r2.8 The first three inequalities imply that ∀ r < r2, the
graph of ∂Π∂p (·; r) can be obtained by shifting that of ∂Π∂p (·; r2) to the upper left, and the last two,
in conjunction with the fact that ∂Π∂p (p
m; r) < 0, imply the existence of a unique local maximum
p∗1(r) ∈ (p∗1, pm) ∀ r ≤ r2. By the FOC ∂Π∂p (p∗1(r); r) = 0 and the implicit function theorem, we have
∂p∗1(r)
∂r
= −
∂2Π
∂p∂r (p
∗
1(r); r)
∂2Π
∂p2 (p
∗
1(r); r)
=
αβf ′(1− αp∗1(r)− r¯ + r)
∂2Π
∂p2 (p
∗
1(r); r)
< 0
because f ′(e) > 0 for any e < eˆ, 1−αp∗1(r)− r¯+ r < 1−αp∗1− r¯+ r2 < eˆ, and ∂
2Π
∂p2 (p
∗
1(r); r) < 0. That
is, p∗1(r) is decreasing in r.
Case 2. When r ≥ r1.
Note again that at r1, the point p = v1 is an inflexion point on the graph of Π (·; r1). Similar to the
arguments in Case (1), define p2(r1) = v1− E2−E1α . Because ∂Π∂p (p2(r1); r1) < 0 and limp→0 ∂Π∂p (p; r1) >
0 by M1, there exists a p∗2 ∈ (0, p2(r1)) such that Π(p; r1) achieves a local maximum. (Refer to Figure
2.)
To extend to the case of r > r1, let p2(r) denote the local minimum point on the function
∂Π
∂p (·; r) .
We can apply arguments analogous to the case of r < r2 to show that the graph of
∂Π
∂p (·; r) can be
obtained by shifting that of ∂Π∂p (·; r2) down and right, and there exists a unique p∗2 (r) ∈ (0, p2 (r)) ∀ r >
r1 that maximizes profits. However, noting that 1−αp∗2(r)− r¯+ r can be either larger or smaller than
eˆ, f ′ (1− αp∗2(r)− r¯ + r) can take positive, negative, or zero values, which implies that p∗2(r) may be
either increasing or decreasing when r > r1.
9
8To obtain the last claim, we first note that ∂
2Π
∂p2
(v2(r); r) = −2α + α2βf ′ (1− αv2 (r)− r¯ + r) = 0 implies that
f ′ (1− αv2 (r)− r¯ + r) = 2/ (αβ) . In fact, noting that ∂Π∂p (·; r) is convex around v2 (r) under M2, we must have 1 −
αv2 (r)−r¯+r = E2 < eˆ. It follows from M1 that f (1− αv2 (r)− r¯ + r) < f (1− αv2 (r)− r¯ + r2) ∀r < r2. Consequently,
∂Π
∂p
(v2(r); r) = 1− αv2 (r)− αβf (1− αv2 (r)− r¯ + r) > 1− αv2 (r)− αβf (1− αv2 (r)− r¯ + r2) = ∂Π∂p (v2(r); r2) > 0.
9Note that 1− αp∗2(r)− r¯ + r > 1− αp∗ − r¯ + r1, and nothing ensures that 1− αp∗2(r)− r¯ + r < eˆ as r > r1.
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Figure 2: Pricing Strategy When r ≥ r1
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Case 3. When r2 < r < r1.
There exist two local maxima, p∗1(r) ∈ (p1(r), pm) and p∗2(r) ∈ (0, p2(r)). Let 4(r) = Π(p∗1(r); r) −
Π(p∗2(r); r). By the envelope theorem and FOC,
∂ 4 (r)
∂r
= βf(1− αp∗1(r)− r¯ + r)− βf(1− αp∗2(r)− r¯ + r)
=
1− 2αp∗1(r)
α
− 1− 2αp
∗
2(r)
α
= 2 [p∗2(r)− p∗1(r)] < 0.
Moreover, noting that 4(r2) > 0 and 4(r1) < 0, there must exist a unique point γ0 ∈ (r2, r1) such
that 4(γ0) = 0. It follows that the seller should adopt p∗1(r) if r ≤ γ0 and p∗2(r) otherwise, and the
desired optimal pricing strategy holds. 
Intuitively, the discontinuous pricing strategy occurs as follows. The restrictions in Assumptions
M1 and M2 produce a peculiar shape of ∂Π∂p (·; r). Along with the increase in p, ∂Π∂p (·; r) is initially
downward sloping and convex, then becomes positive sloping and concave, and then eventually slopes
downward again. Thus, for any given r 6= r1, r2, there are three possible ways that ∂Π∂p (·; r) intersects
with the horizontal axis:
Case 1: the intersection occurs in the concave region alone (refer to Figure 1);
Case 2: the intersection occurs in the convex region alone (refer to Figure 2); and
Case 3: the intersection occurs in both regions (refer to Figure 3).
In the preceding proof, we show that the pricing scheme in Case 1 is associated with small values of
8
Figure 3: Pricing Strategy When r ∈ (r2, r1)
p                                 
r₂<r<r₁ 
p₂(r)
p₁(r)
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r, whereas that in Case 2 corresponds to large r’s. Then, in Case 3, there exists a threshold value of
r such that the seller will switch between the two pricing schemes. It is the presence of segment of
a positively sloped ∂Π∂p (·; r) that makes the profit function Π(; , r) exhibits a bimodal shape, which in
turn induces discontinuity in the optimal pricing. If it were not the case, the profit function would be
globally concave and pricing scheme change may not occur.
We first take a closer look at Case 1 by considering a slight increase in p when p < v2. When r
is small, the marginal profit in the current monopoly pricing always dominates the marginal cost of
losing the potential benefit of goodwill. Therefore, the unique maximum of Π occurs in the concave
region of ∂Π∂p (·; r) in this case. The decreasing pricing pattern in r simply reflects the fact that the
potential benefit of goodwill becomes more significant as r increases.
Parallel to the first case, we next consider a decrease in p at p > v1 in Case 2. When r is small, the
loss of marginal profit in the current monopoly pricing may now be compensated for by the potential
gain from future goodwill. Therefore, the unique maximum in this case occurs in the convex region of
∂Π
∂p (·; r). In this case, as r is sufficiently close to r¯, the pricing decision may face e on either side of
eˆ. Therefore, the pricing pattern in r results in an ambiguous sign. On the graphs, this entails slope
changes on ∂Π∂p (·; r) as it shifts down and right. Figure 2 shows only one of the possibilities, that is,
that the curve gets a flatter slope when ∂Π∂p (·; r) shifts in connection with an increase in r.
In the pricing situation in Case 3, the seller needs to choose between two local maxima, p∗1(r) and
p∗2(r), as illustrated in Figure 3. Switching from p
∗
1(r) to p
∗
2(r) induces a trade-off between the two
areas in the region, (p∗2(r), p
∗
1(r)). The size of the gain is represented by the area below the horizontal
axis, whereas the magnitude of loss is shown by the area above the horizontal axis. Consider a seller
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with an r close to r2. As the gain from changing is not significant enough to compensate for the loss,
the seller will continue to charge p∗1(r). However, along with the increase in r, there must exist a γ0
that makes it worthwhile for the seller to switch to pricing regime p∗2(r).
In summary, the seller’s optimal pricing schedule when r ∈ [γ0, r¯] is different from that when
r < γ0. There is a discontinuity in the pricing function, which occurs at γ0. In our model, such a
“jump” reflects the local maxima switches at the seller’s optimal pricing decision. It is this particular
pricing pattern that is referred as the “goodwill effect” in this paper.
The mechanism for generating the discontinuity in the pricing strategy relies on the shape of
underlying density function f . The exact location of γ0, however, hinges on the model parameters
of α and β, which capture the market demand situation and the seller’s perceived gain from future
goodwill, respectively. We may naturally expect that the sellers are heterogeneous and that different
sellers face different sets of such model parameters upon making their decisions. As in any typical
empirical work, our economic model can also accommodate other covariates to control the observed
heterogeneity across sellers. Beyond this, we adopt quantile regression approach to our econometric
analysis. Quantile regressions are a flexible way to model the heterogeneous influences of explanatory
variables on the response variable, which is the selling price here. We thus develop a method to identify
and estimate the heterogeneity in the pricing patterns for goodwill in the threshold quantile regression
framework.
To proceed, it is worth mentioning that nothing in the economic model can ensure that the optimal
pricing strategy before or after a certain threshold value (γ0 above) is linear in reputation level r.
Despite this, we still focus on a linear QRTM in the next section for two reasons. First, the linear
QRTM can be regarded as a first-order approximation to the true optimal pricing strategy. Second,
the vector of regressors in our model is allowed to include any transformation of the reputation level
(say, r, r2, r3, etc.), and thus the quadratic or cubic terms can be included in the regression model to
take into account the potential nonlinearity in the optimal pricing strategy.
3 A Quantile Regression Threshold Model
In this section, we first test for the existence of a change (threshold) point in pricing behavior. After
confirming the change point, we then consider the estimation of both the change point and the jump
size.
3.1 A simple quantile regression threshold model
Let {yi, xi, ri}ni=1 be an independent sample, where yi and ri are real-valued and xi is a k× 1 random
vector. The threshold variable ri may be an element of xi, and is assumed to have a continuous
distribution. We assume that the τth conditional quantile of yi, given xi and ri, is given by
Qτ (zi) = α
′
τxi1 {ri ≤ γτ}+ β′τxi1 {ri > γτ} , (3.1)
10
where zi ≡ (x′i, ri)′ if ri /∈ xi, and zi ≡ xi otherwise; 1 {A} is an indicator function that takes a value
of one if A holds true, and zero otherwise; and δτ ≡ ατ − βτ may be nonzero for some unknown
threshold point γτ . If δτ is 0 for all γτ on the support of ri for all τ ∈ (0, 1) , then we can say there is
no structural change in the quantile regression model (3.1). For technical simplicity, below we assume
that γτ can only take values in a compact set Γ.
When applying the foregoing econometric model to study the optimal pricing behavior for goodwill,
the threshold variable ri is the reputation level, the response variable yi is the observed price, and the
regressor vector xi can be specified in different ways. For example, one can set xi = (1, ri)
′
, which
specifies linear pricing behavior before and after the potential break point γτ . Alternatively, one can set
xi =
(
1, ri, r
2
i
)′
to allow the optimal prices to depend on the reputation level in a nonlinear pattern. Of
course, we can also include other control variables in xi to account for the influence of other variables
on prices.
Let θ1τ = (α
′
τ , β
′
τ )
′
and θτ = (θ
′
1τ , γτ )
′.Define the “check function”ρτ (·) by ρτ (u) = (τ − 1 {u < 0})u.
Following Koenker and Bassett (1978), we obtain the quantile estimate θˆτ of θτ as
θˆτ = argmin
θτ
Snτ (θτ ) with Snτ (θτ ) =
n∑
i=1
ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ )) , (3.2)
where
zi (γ) = (x
′
i1 {ri ≤ γ} , x′i1 {ri > γ})′ .
For this minimization, there is no closed form solution. In fact, the objective function is not convex
in all of its parameters, and so it is difficult to obtain the global minimizer. Nevertheless, we can
consider the profile quantile regression. For this, we first pretend that γτ is known, and obtain an
estimate of (ατ , βτ ) by(
αˆτ (γτ ) , βˆτ (γτ )
)
≡
(
αˆ (τ, γτ ) , βˆ (τ, γτ )
)
= argmin
ατ ,βτ
Snτ (ατ , βτ , γτ ) . (3.3)
Let Sˆnτ (γτ ) ≡ Snτ (αˆτ (γτ ) , βˆτ (γτ ) , γτ ). Then, we can estimate γτ by
γˆτ = argmin
γ∈Γ
Sˆnτ (γ) . (3.4)
Noting that Sˆnτ (γ) takes on fewer than n distinct values, we can define γˆτ uniquely by choosing
γτ over Γn = Γ ∩ {q1, q2, · · · , qn}. Then, computing γˆτ requires at most n function evaluations. As
Hansen (2000) and Caner (2002) suggested, if n is large, then we can approximate Γ by a grid. After γˆτ
is obtained, we can compute the estimates of ατ and βτ as αˆτ = αˆτ (γˆτ ) and βˆτ = βˆτ (γˆτ ) , respectively.
3.2 Test for the existence of a change point
The above computation is meaningful only if γτ is identified, in which case a structural change occurs
for the τth conditional quantile regression. It is thus worthwhile to consider a test for the existence of
a structural change before embarking on the estimation of γτ .
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Let T = [τ , τ ] ⊂ (0, 1) . Let Θ1 ⊂ R2k denote the compact support for θ1τ .10 Let θ0n1τ =
(
α0′nτ , β
0′
nτ
)′
denote the true value of θ1τ . We allow θ
0
n1τ to be n-dependent to facilitate the study of estimates of
θ1τ in the case where we have a structural change but the jump size shrinks to zero as the sample size
n → ∞ (see Assumption A7 below). But, for notational simplicity, we suppress the dependence of
θ0n1τ , α
0
nτ , and β
0
nτ on n and write them as θ
0
1τ , α
0
τ , and β
0
τ , respectively.
The null hypothesis is
H0 : Qτ (zi) = zi (γ)′ θ01τ for some θ01τ ∈ Θ1 with α0τ = β0τ for all τ ∈ T , (3.5)
regardless of the value of γ ∈ Γ, and the alternative hypothesis is
H1 : Qτ (zi) = zt
(
γ0τ
)′
θ01τ for some θ
0
1τ ∈ Θ1 with α0τ 6= β0τ for some τ ∈ T , (3.6)
where γ0τ ∈ Γ.
Clearly, both H0 and H1 are composite hypotheses, and they are designed to test the existence of a
structural change at an arbitrary quantile point τ . For different τ ’s, the structural changes are allowed
to occur at different threshold values γ0τ under H1. If we restrict our attention to a single quantile τ,
i.e., T = {τ} , then we can consider the following null hypothesis.
H0τ : Qτ (zi) = zi (γ)′ θ01τ for some θ01τ ∈ Θ1 with α0τ = β0τ , (3.7)
regardless of the value of γ ∈ Γ, and the alternative hypothesis becomes
H1τ : Qτ (zi) = zi
(
γ0τ
)′
θ01τ for some θ
0
1τ ∈ Θ1 with α0τ 6= β0τ and γ0τ ∈ Γ. (3.8)
The above formulation motivates us to consider the following τth quantile regression of yi on zi (γ) .
θˆ1 (τ, γ) =
(
αˆ (τ, γ)
′
, βˆ (τ, γ)
′
)′
= argmin
θ1
n∑
i=1
ρτ (yi − θ′1zi (γ)) . (3.9)
Noting that γ is not identified under H0 for any τ ∈ T , we cannot consider the estimation of γτ
analogously to (3.4). Nevertheless, we can study the asymptotic property of θˆ1 (τ, γ) under H0, and
propose a test for the null hypothesis of no structural change for all τ over T by considering the
asymptotic behavior of δˆ (τ, γ) ≡ αˆ (τ, γ)− βˆ (τ, γ) over the compact set T × Γ.
To proceed, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption A1. (yi, zi), i = 1, · · · , n, are independent and identically distributed (IID).
Assumption A2. E ‖xi‖2 <∞.
Assumption A3. The conditional distribution function (CDF) F (·|z) of yi given zi = z admits a
Lebesgue probability density function (PDF) f (·|z) such that (i) f (·|z) is continuous for each z, and
(ii) f (·|z) is uniformly bounded for each z.
Assumption A4. The threshold variable ri is continuously distributed with continuous PDF g (·) .
Assumption A5. Let Ω1 (τ, γ) ≡ E[f
(
θ0′1τzi (γ) |zi
)
zi (γ) zi (γ)
′
]. Ω1 (τ, γ) is positive definite for
each (τ, γ) ∈ T × Γ.
10In principle, we can allow the support of θ1τ to be τ -dependent, and write Θ1 as Θ1τ .
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Assumption A1 requires IID observations, but it can be weakened to allow for time series obser-
vations by using the concept of mixing processes, as in Bai (1995), Hansen (2000), Caner (2002), Su
and Xiao (2008), and Galvao et al. (2010). Assumptions A2-A4 specify standard conditions on the
threshold regressions; see, e.g., Galvao et al. (2011).
The following theorem is adapted from Galvao et al. (2011).
Theorem 3.1 Suppose Assumptions A1-A5 hold. Then, under H0, θˆ1 (τ, γ) admits the following uni-
form Bahadur representation
√
n
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ)− θ01τ
)
= Ω1 (τ, γ)
−1 1√
n
n∑
i=1
ψτ
(
yi − α0′τ xi
)
zi (γ) + oP (1) ,
where ψτ (u) = τ − 1 {u < 0} , and oP (1) holds uniformly in (τ, γ) ∈ T × Γ.
Let Ω0 (γ1, γ2) ≡ E[zi (γ1) zi (γ2)′]. Let l∞ (T × Γ) denote the space of all bounded functions on
T × Γ equipped with the uniform topology. From Theorem 3.1, we can easily obtain that under H0,
√
n
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ)− θ01τ
)
⇒ Ω1 (τ, γ)−1W (τ, γ) in (l∞ (T × Γ))2k ,
where ⇒ denotes weak convergence, and W (τ, γ) is a zero-mean Gaussian process on T × Γ with
covariance kernel
E
[
W (τ1, γ1)W (τ2, γ2)
′]
= (τ1 ∧ τ2 − τ1τ2) Ω0 (γ1, γ2) .
Observe that
Ω0 (γ, γ) =
(
Ω (γ) 0k×k
0k×k Ω∗ (γ)
)
, Ω1 (τ, γ) =
(
Ω (τ, γ) 0k×k
0k×k Ω∗ (τ, γ)
)
,
where Ω (γ) = E [xix
′
i1 {ri ≤ γ}] , Ω∗ (γ) = E [xix′i1 {ri > γ}] , Ω (τ, γ) = E
[
xix
′
i1 {ri ≤ γ} f
(
α0′τ xi|zi
)]
,
and Ω∗ (τ, γ) = E
[
xix
′
i1 {ri > γ} f
(
β0′τ xi|zi
)]
. Let δˆ (τ, γ) = αˆ (τ, γ) − βˆ (τ, γ) = Rθˆ1 (τ, γ) , where
R = [Ik,−Ik] and Ik is a k × k identity matrix. The block diagonality of Ω0 and Ω1 implies the
asymptotic independence between αˆ (τ, γ) and βˆ (τ, γ) . It follows that for each (τ, γ)
√
nδˆ (τ, γ)
d→ N (0k×1, τ (1− τ)V (τ, γ)) , (3.10)
where
d→ denotes convergence in distribution, and
V (τ, γ) ≡ Ω (τ, γ)−1 Ω (γ) Ω (τ, γ)−1 + Ω∗ (τ, γ)−1 Ω∗ (γ) Ω∗ (τ, γ)−1 . (3.11)
Let
Ωˆ (γ) ≡ n−1
n∑
i=1
xix
′
i1 {ri ≤ γ} , Ωˆ∗ (γ) ≡ n−1
n∑
i=1
xix
′
i − Ωˆ (γ) ,
Ωˆ (τ, γ) ≡ (2nh)−1
n∑
i=1
1 {|yi − x′iαˆτ | ≤ h}xix′i1 {ri ≤ γ} , and
Ωˆ∗ (τ, γ) ≡ (2nh)−1
n∑
i=1
1
{∣∣∣yi − x′iβˆτ ∣∣∣ ≤ h}xix′i1 {ri > γ} ,
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where h ≡ h (n) is a bandwidth parameter such that h → 0 and nh2 → ∞ as n → ∞ (see Koenker,
2005, pp. 80-81). It is easy to show that the above estimators are uniformly consistent with Ω (γ) ,
Ω∗ (γ) , Ω (τ, γ) , and Ω∗ (τ, γ) , respectively, over T × Γ. Thus, a uniformly consistent estimate of
V (τ, γ) is given by
Vˆ (τ, γ) ≡ Ωˆ (τ, γ)−1 Ωˆ (γ) Ωˆ (τ, γ)−1 + Ωˆ∗ (τ, γ)−1 Ωˆ∗ (γ) Ωˆ∗ (τ, γ)−1 . (3.12)
Following Qu (2008), Su and Xiao (2008), and Galvao et al. (2010), we can consider the sup-Wald
statistic for testing H0 given by
supWn ≡ sup
(τ,γ)∈T ×Γ
Wn (τ, γ) , (3.13)
where Wn (τ, γ) = nδˆ (τ, γ)
′
[τ (1− τ) Vˆ (τ, γ)]−1δˆ (τ, γ) , and we reject H0 for large values of supWn.
By the above discussions, the Slutsky theorem, and the continuous mapping theorem (CMT), we have
supWn
d→ sup
(τ,γ)∈T ×Γ
1
τ (1− τ)W (τ, γ)
′
Ω1 (τ, γ)
−1
R′
[
RΩ1 (τ, γ)
−1
Ω0 (γ, γ) Ω1 (τ, γ)
−1
R′
]−1
×RΩ1 (τ, γ)−1W (τ, γ) . (3.14)
Let A be a p1 × q matrix and B a q× p2 matrix such that rank(A) = q =rank(B) . Let A+ denote the
Moore-Penrose generalized inverse of A. Then,
(AB)
+
= B+A+ = B′ (BB′)−1 (A′A)−1A′ (3.15)
by Fact 6.4.8 in Bernstein (2005). Using (3.15) repeatedly, we can readily show that the right-hand
side of (3.14) simplifies to
sup
(τ,γ)∈T ×Γ
1
τ (1− τ)W (τ, γ)
′
Ω0 (γ, γ)
−1
W (τ, γ) . (3.16)
The following corollary summarizes the asymptotic distribution of supWn.
Corollary 3.2 Suppose Assumptions A1-A5 hold. Then, under H0,
supWn
d→ sup
(τ,γ)∈T ×Γ
1
τ (1− τ)W (τ, γ)
′
Ω0 (γ, γ)
−1
W (τ, γ) .
Like Su and Xiao (2008, Theorem 3.3), the limiting distribution of supWn depends only on the
Gaussian process W (τ, γ) . Unlike Su and Xiao (2008), Corollary 3.2 indicates that the limiting distri-
bution of supWn is not pivotal because W¯ (τ, γ) ≡ Ω0 (γ, γ)−1/2W (τ, γ) is a Gaussian process with
covariance kernel
E
[
W¯ (τ1, γ1) W¯ (τ2, γ2)
′]
= (τ1 ∧ τ2 − τ1τ2) Ω0 (γ1, γ1)−1/2 Ω0 (γ1, γ2) Ω0 (γ2, γ2)−1/2 ,
and Ω0 (γ1, γ2) is not parameter-free. This implies that the critical values for the supWn test cannot
be tabulated in general.
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Nevertheless, given the simple structure of W (τ, γ) , we can readily simulate the critical values for
the supWn test statistic. Given {zi, i = 1, ..., n} , we can consistently estimate Ω0 (γ, γ) by
Ωˆ0 (γ, γ) =
(
Ωˆ (γ) 0k×k
0k×k Ωˆ∗ (γ)
)
and then simulate the critical values of the supWn as follows.
1. Generate {ui, i = 1, ..., n} IID uniform on [0, 1] .
2. Calculate wn (τ, γ) = n
−1/2∑n
i=1[τ − 1 {ui ≤ τ}]zi (γ) .
3. Compute supW ∗n ≡ sup(τ,γ)∈T ×Γ 1τ(1−τ)wn (τ, γ)′ Ωˆ0 (γ, γ)−1 wn (τ, γ) . 11
4. Repeat steps 1-3 B times and denote the resulting supW ∗n test statistics as supW
∗
n,j for j =
1, · · · , B.
Obviously, wn (τ, γ) ⇒ W (τ, γ) in (l∞ (T × Γ))2k . When B is sufficiently large, the asymptotic
critical value of the level α test based on supWn is approximately given by the empirical upper α-
quantile of
{
supW ∗n,j , j = 1, ..., B
}
. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis H0 if the simulated
p-value
p∗ ≡ B−1
B∑
j=1
1
{
supW ∗n,j ≥ supWn
}
is smaller than the prescribed nominal level of significance α.
Note that by choosing T as a large compact subset of (0, 1) , the above test can detect various
violations of the null hypothesis. Alternatively, by specifying T = {τ} we can consider the test of
structural change at a single quantile τ. In the case in which we reject H0τ for the specified τ, we can
further consider the estimation of the break point γτ under H1τ .
3.3 Asymptotic properties of θˆτ under H1τ
Let θˆ1τ = (αˆ
′
τ , βˆ
′
τ )
′. In this subsection, we first prove the consistency of θˆτ = (θˆ′1τ , γˆτ )
′ under H1τ , and
then report the convergence rates and asymptotic distributions of θˆ1τ and γˆτ .
To study the consistency of θˆτ , we add the following identification condition.
Assumption A6. Let ∆ (zi, θτ ) ≡ zi (γτ )′ θ1τ − zi
(
γ0τ
)′
θ01τ . There exists: c0 > 0 such that
P (|∆ (zi, θτ )| > c0) > 0 for all θτ ∈ Θ such that θτ 6= θ0τ , where Θ = Θ1 × Γ.
In the special case of xi = (1, ri)
′
, we can write α0τ = (α
0
0τ , α
0
1τ )
′ and β0τ = (β
0
0τ , β
0
1τ )
′, where α00τ and
β00τ are the true values of the intercept parameters before and after the break, and α
0
1τ and β
0
1τ are the
11In practice, we compute the supWn by constructing a fine partition Tm1 ×Γm2 ⊂ T ×Γ by a finite grid of m1×m2
points. In our applications, we set m1 = m2 = 81 and choose T81 = {0.10, 0.11, · · · , 0.90} and Γ81 as the collection of
the τth quantile of qi for τ ∈ T81. To obtain the simulated p-value, one can choose a finer partition because of the fast
speed of computing supWn,j .
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true values of the slope parameters before and after the break. Let dτ ≡ (α0τ − β0τ ) + (α1τ − β1τ ) γ0τ .
Then, a sufficient condition for Assumption A6 to hold is
dτ 6= 0.
The following theorem establishes the strong consistency of θˆτ .
Theorem 3.3 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4 and A6 hold. Then,
θˆτ = θ
0
τ + oa.s. (1) ,
where θ0τ = (θ
0′
1τ , γ
0
τ )
′.
To study the convergence rates of θˆ1τ and γˆτ , we note that the convergence rate of γˆτ depends on
the size of the structural change and that θˆ1τ and γˆτ typically have different convergence rates.
The following assumption specifies the magnitude of structural change in the coefficients.
Assumption A7. Let δ0τ ≡ δ0nτ ≡ α0nτ − β0nτ . δ0τ = vτn−a with vτ 6= 0 and a ∈ (0, 12 ).
Note that Hansen (2000) and Caner (2002) also allow a ∈ (0, 12 ), in which case the break magnitude
δ0τ = δ
0
nτ shrinks to 0 as n→∞. We also remark on the case of a = 0.
The following theorem establishes the convergence rates of θˆ1τ and γˆτ under H1τ .
Theorem 3.4 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4 and A6-A7 hold. Then,
n1/2
(
θˆ1τ − θ01τ
)
= OP (1) and n
1−2a (γˆτ − γ0τ) = OP (1) .
In fact, the above convergence rates can also be obtained in the case of a = 0 in A7. To study the
asymptotic distributions of θˆ1τ and γˆτ , we add the following assumption.
Assumption A8. (i) Let Nτ (γ) ≡ E [xix′i|ri = γ] , Dτ (γ) ≡ E
[
f
(
α0′τ xi|zi
)
xix
′
i|ri = γ
]
, Nτ ≡
Nτ
(
γ0τ
)
, and Dτ ≡ Dτ
(
γ0τ
)
. Nτ (γ) and Dτ (γ) are continuous at γ
0
τ . v
′
τNτvτ > 0, v
′
τDτvτ > 0, and
g
(
γ0τ
)
> 0.
(ii) E ‖xi‖4 <∞.
Theorem 3.5 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4 and A6-A8 hold. Then,
(i) n1/2
(
θˆ1τ − θ01τ
)
d→ N (02k×1, τ (1− τ) Σ (τ, γ0τ)) where Σ (τ, γ) ≡ Ω1 (τ, γ)−1 Ω0 (γ, γ) Ω1 (τ, γ)−1 .
(ii) n1−2a
(
γˆτ − γ0τ
) d→ λτ4µ2τ argmaxr∈(−∞,∞){W (r)− 12 |r|} where λτ ≡ v′τNτvτg (γ0τ) , µτ ≡ v′τDτvτg (γ0τ) ,
and W (·) is a two-sided Brownian motion.12
(iii) θˆ1τ and γˆτ are asymptotically independent.
Based on the above theorem, we can conduct asymptotic tests for both the coefficient and threshold
parameters. Because θˆ1τ is asymptotically normally distributed, the statistical inferences for θ1τ are
standard. It is worth mentioning that the result in Theorem 3.5(i) continues to hold even if one allows
12A two-sided Brownian motion on the real line is defined as W (r) = W1 (−r) 1 {r ≤ 0} + W2 (r) 1 {r > 0} , where
W1 (r) and W2 (r) are two independent standard Brownian motions on [0,∞).
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a = 0 in Assumption A7. However, the asymptotic distribution of γˆτ in Theorem 3.5(ii) remains valid
only for the case of a ∈ (0, 12) in A7, analogously to the case of the least squares threshold regression
in Hansen (2000). In the case of a = 0, if we assume the independence of εiτ and zi, then we can apply
the result of Koul et al. (2003) and demonstrate that n
(
γˆτ − γ0τ
)
converges in distribution to the
argmin of a two-sided compound Poisson process. However, such an independence assumption seems
too strong, and thus we focus only on the case of a ∈ (0, 12) . In the following subsection, we study a
likelihood ratio test for γτ .
3.4 A likelihood ratio test for threshold parameter γτ
To test the hypotheses of threshold parameter γτ , we follow Hansen (2000) and Caner (2002) and
consider a likelihood ratio (LR) statistic. The null hypothesis is
H0τ : γτ = γ
0
τ , (3.17)
and the LR statistic is
LRnτ (γτ ) = Snτ
(
θˆ1 (τ, γτ ) , γτ
)
− Snτ
(
θˆ1τ , γˆτ
)
.
We reject H0τ for large values of LRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
.
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic distribution of LRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
under H0τ defined in
(3.17).
Theorem 3.6 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4 and A6-A8 hold. Then, under H0τ ,
LRnτ
(
γ0τ
) d→ λτ
4µτ
Ξ,
where Ξ ≡ supr∈(−∞,∞) {2W (r)− |r|} .
Alternatively, we can consider the following test statistic.
LRanτ
(
γ0τ
) ≡ Snτ (θˆ1τ , γ0τ)− Snτ (θˆ1τ , γˆτ) .
Following the proof of Theorem 3.6, we can readily show that LRanτ
(
γ0τ
) d→ λτ4µτ Ξ. That is, LRnτ (γ0τ)
and LRanτ
(
γ0τ
)
share the same asymptotic distribution under H0τ .
Theorem 3.6 indicates that we can consider the following normalized LR test statistic.
NLRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
=
4δ˜′τ D˜τ δ˜τ
δ˜′τ N˜τ δ˜τ
LRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
,
where δ˜τ ≡ αˆτ
(
γ0τ
) − βˆτ (γ0τ) ; N˜τ is a consistent local linear (or constant) estimate of Nτ (γ0τ) ≡
E
[
xix
′
i|ri = γ0τ
]
by using the bandwidth h1 and the kernel K;
D˜τ = Eˆh1
[
fˆh1
(
αˆτ
(
γ0τ
)′
xi |zi
)
xix
′
i|ri = γ0τ
]
;
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fˆh1 (·|zi) is a kernel estimate for the density of yi given zi by using the bandwidth h1 and the kernel K;
and Eˆh1
(·|ri = γ0τ) is a kernel estimate of E [f (α0′τ xi|zi)xix′i|ri = γ0τ ] by using the bandwidth h1, the
kernel K, and the observations on fˆh1
(
αˆτ
(
γ0τ
)′
xi |zi
)
xix
′
i and ri. Under the assumption that zi is
compactly supported with bounded density that is bounded away from 0 on its support, we realize that
one can obtain both estimates by the local linear method to avoid boundary bias and the asymptotic
trimming issue. See Fan et al. (1996) for the local linear estimation of conditional density.
Under standard conditions, we can show that
δ˜′τ D˜τ δ˜τ
δ˜′τ N˜τ δ˜τ
→ µτλτ in probability. Then, by the Slutsky
lemma, we have
NLRnτ
(
γ0τ
) d→ Ξ.
That is, NLRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
is asymptotically pivotal. It is well known that supr≤0[2W (r) − |r|] and
supr≥0[2W (r)− |r|] are independent exponential random variables with distribution function 1− e−z
such that the CDF of Ξ is given by P (Ξ ≤ z) = (1− e−z/2)2 . We can easily tabulate the asymptotic
critical values for the normalized statistic NLRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
. See Hansen (2000, p. 582) for more details.
3.5 Inference in the case of a common break
The above analysis can be extended to the case in which different conditional quantile functions share
a common threshold value. In this case, joint analysis of multiple quantile regressions may improve
the accuracy of the common threshold estimate.
Recall that T ≡ [τ , τ ] ⊂ (0, 1) . If, for all τ ∈ T , the conditional quantile regressions share a common
threshold γ, then we can estimate γ by
γˆ ≡ γˆ (Π) ≡ argmin
γ∈Γ
Sˆn,Π (γ) ,
where Sˆn,Π (γ) =
∫
Snτ
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ) , γ
)
dΠ (τ) , and Π is a user-specified probability distribution function
defined on T .
After we obtain the estimate γˆ of γ, we can estimate α0τ and β
0
τ by αˆτ = αˆ (τ, γˆ) and βˆτ = βˆ (τ, γˆ) ,
respectively. As before, let θˆ1 (τ, γ) ≡ (αˆ (τ, γ)′ , βˆ (τ, γ)′)′ and θˆ1τ ≡ (αˆ′τ , βˆ′τ )′. To study the asymptotic
properties of γˆ, θˆ1τ , and θˆ1 (τ, γ) , we add the following assumption.
Assumption A9. (i) Let θ01 (τ, γ) ≡ argminθ1S (θ1; τ, γ) , where S (θ1; τ, γ) ≡ E [ρτ (yi − θ′1zi (γ))].
There exists a γ0 ∈ Γ such that γ0 =argminγS
(
θ01 (τ, γ) ; τ, γ
)
for all τ .
(ii) Let θ01τ ≡ θ01
(
τ, γ0
)
and ∆ (zi, τ, γ)≡ θ01 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)−θ0′1τzi
(
γ0
)
, and
∫
P (|∆ (zi, τ, γ)| > 0) dΠ (τ) >
0 for all γ 6= γ0.
(iii) Let Ω¯1 (τ, γ) ≡ E[f
(
θ01 (τ, γ) zi (γ) |zi
)
zi (γ) zi (γ)
′
], and Ω¯1 (τ, γ) is positive definite for all
(τ, γ) ∈ T × Γ.
Observe that E [ρτ (yi − θ′1zi (γ))] is convex in θ1 for all (τ, γ) ∈ T ×Γ, and θ01 (τ, γ) in A9(i) exists
and is uniquely defined. It is also continuous in (τ, γ) by an application of the maximum theorem.
The first-order condition for the minimization of S (θ1; τ, γ) with respect to θ1 implies that
E
[
ψτ
(
yi − θ01 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
zi (γ)
]
= 0 for all (τ, γ) ∈ T × Γ, (3.18)
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which will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.7 below. The last part of A9(i) simply restricts the
conditional quantile regression from sharing a common break γ0, which does not depend on τ ∈ T .
Like Assumption A6, A9(ii) is an identification condition and requires that γ0 is the unique common
break. A9(iii) extends A5. Note that Ω¯1
(
τ, γ0
)
= Ω1
(
τ, γ0
)
under A9(i)-(ii).
The following theorem summarizes the important properties of γˆ, θˆ1τ , and θˆ1 (τ, γ) .
Theorem 3.7 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4 and A6-A9 hold. Then,
(i) γˆ = γ0 + oP (1) and θˆ1τ = θ
0
1τ + oP (1) for each τ ∈ T ;
(ii)
√
n
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ)− θ01 (τ, γ)
)
= Ω¯1 (τ, γ)
−1 1√
n
∑n
i=1 ψτ
(
yi − θ01 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
zi (γ) + oP (1) , where
oP (1) holds uniformly over T × Γ;
(iii) n1/2
(
θˆ1τ − θ01τ
)
d→ N (02k×1, τ (1− τ) Σ (τ, γ0));
(iv) n1−2a
(
γˆ − γ0) d→ λ0
4µ20
argmax
r∈(−∞,∞)
{
W (r)− 12 |r|
}
, where λ0 ≡ {
∫ √
v′τNτ (γ0) vτdΠ (τ)}2g
(
γ0
)
and µ0 ≡
∫
v′τDτ
(
γ0
)
vτdΠ (τ) g
(
γ0
)
; and
(v) θˆ1τ and γˆ are asymptotically independent.
Theorem 3.7(i) implies the consistency of the parameter estimates. Theorem 3.7(ii) extends the
Bahadur uniform representation result in Theorem 3.1 to allow a single common break in the quantile
processes. Theorem 3.7(iii) indicates that the first-order asymptotic distribution of θˆ1τ is the same as
that obtained before. This is largely due to the asymptotic orthogonality of the coefficient parameter
estimate and the threshold parameter estimate. The last two parts of Theorem 3.7 are parallel to those
in Theorem 3.5.
As in the previous subsection, we can consider testing the following composite hypothesis of common
threshold parameter γ.
H0 : γτ = γ
0 for all τ ∈ T . (3.19)
We now investigate two LR-type statistics. The first is
LRn1 (γ) = Sˆn,Π (γ)− Sˆn,Π (γˆ) =
∫ [
Snτ
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ) , γ
)
− Snτ
(
θˆ1τ , γˆ
)]
dΠ (τ) ,
which is useful if we strongly believe that the quantile regressions for different τ ’s share a common
threshold point but are not sure about the exact value of that threshold. The second statistic is
LRn2 (γ) =
∫ [
Snτ
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ) , γ
)
− Snτ
(
θˆ1 (τ, γˆτ ) , γˆτ
)]
dΠ (τ) .
We reject H0 for large values of LRnj
(
γ0
)
, j = 1, 2.
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic distributions of LRn1
(
γ0
)
and LRn2
(
γ0
)
under
H0 in (3.19).
Theorem 3.8 Suppose that Assumptions A1-A4 and A6-A9 hold. Then, under H0, we have
(i) LRn1
(
γ0
) d→ λ04µ0 Ξ, and
(ii) LRn2
(
γ0
) d→ ∫ λτ4µτ dΠ (τ) Ξ,
where Ξ is as defined in Theorem 3.6.
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Clearly, the asymptotic distribution of LRn1
(
γ0
)
is analogous to that of LRnτ
(
γ0
)
in Theorem 3.6
under H0τ for a specific quantile τ, and that of LRn2
(
γ0
)
is a weighted version of that of LRnτ
(
γ0
)
.
4 Empirical Application: Taobao.com
In this paper, we investigate the reputation and pricing patterns on Taobao.com, the dominant
online trading platform in China.
4.1 Data
We collect trading data on the iPod Nano IV 8G on Taobao.com from September to December 2009.
Two factors motivate us to choose the iPod Nano for this study. First, developed by Apple, the iPod
Nano has become a popular choice among young consumers in China. This group of consumers is more
familiar, and therefore more comfortable, with the trading rules and logistics of online transactions.
Consequently, this group is more likely to become the target of online promotions. Second, the iPod
Nano is designed to differentiate itself substantially from the other digital media players available on
the market. Therefore, to a large extent, we sustain our analysis on a homogeneous product.
In our sample, we observe posting prices (price), the reputation score and category of the seller at
the time of posting (reputation score), whether postage is included in the posted prices (postage), the
total number of items sold by the seller (total items), the sales volume last recorded per posting item
(sales volume), the rate of good reviews obtained by the seller (rate of good reviews), and the seller’s
location (area code).13
The reputation scoring system on Taobao.com works as follows. Once a transaction is completed,
a buyer who is a member of Taobao.com is qualified to review the seller’s service according to her
experience of the transaction. In addition to any written comments, the review has to conclude with
a rating of “good,” “neutral,” or “bad.” In accordance with the buyer’s review, the seller accrues one
point for a “good” review, loses one point for a “bad” one, and gets nothing for a “neutral” review.
Taobao.com also categorizes sellers’ reputation status based on their reputation scores. Table 1 lists
the 20 categories. For example, a seller with a reputation score between 4 and 10 falls into the “1-
heart”category. The categories progress with numbers 1 to 5 and from heart to diamond, crown, and
gold crown.
Figure 4 plots the histogram of each seller’s reputation category based on the data. Most of the
sellers are spread between Categories 1 and 9 (1-heart to 4-diamonds). Very few have accumulated
more than 50,000 good reviews (Category 12). From the data, we spot a possible exogenous cutoff
that might provide incentives for the sellers on Taobao.com to price for goodwill: that is, 5000, the
point at which a seller moves from Category 9 (4-diamonds) to Category 10 (5-diamonds). Sellers near
the cutoff of 5000 are strongly motivated to move up to 5-diamonds, where they can enjoy a higher
13We also observe the actual transaction prices. However, these prices have a great deal of noise, due to the options of
an additional set menu at each seller’s store. We therefore decide to focus on the posting price in our empirical analysis.
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Table 1: Reputation Scoring System on Taobao.com
Category Points needed Category icon Category Points needed Category icon
1 4-10 1-heart 11 10001-20000 1-crown
2 11-40 2-hearts 12 20001-50000 2-crowns
3 41-90 3-hearts 13 50001-100000 3-crowns
4 91-150 4-hearts 14 100001-200000 4-crowns
5 151-250 5-hearts 15 200001-500000 5-crowns
6 251-500 1-diamond 16 500001-1000000 1-gold crown
7 501-1000 2-diamonds 17 1000001-2000000 2-gold crowns
8 1001-2000 3-diamonds 18 2000001-5000000 3-gold crowns
9 2001-5000 4-diamonds 19 5000001-10000000 4-gold crowns
10 5001-10000 5-diamonds 20 10000000+ 5-gold crowns
Figure 4: Histogram of Reputation Category
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variables Min Max Mean Median Std dev
price 508 1500 1010.34 1050 166.01
reputation score 251 4995 1412.34 824 1243.00
total items 0 36811 537.62 236 1518.73
postage 0 120 11.61 10 11.35
sales volume 0 300 3.27 0 12.15
rate of good reviews 0 100 89.16 99.83 30.65
NOTE: The sample includes only sellers that belong to Categories 6 to 9. The total number of
observations is 2727.
pay-off from their better reputation, with a tremendous reduction in competition. We therefore define
“goodwill” in this application by a seller’s reputation classified as Category 10 or above.
In the application, we face the potential issue of sellers’ maturity. For example, a new seller may
have a greater chance of being “badly” behaved, as the reputation concern is of less significance to
him. Taking this possibility into account, we regard sellers with a reputation score of less than 250
(Category 5) as rookies and exclude them from our data analysis.14 Therefore, the sample for this
study includes only sellers with reputation scores between 250 and 5000, and the total number of
observations is n =2727.
Table 2 lists the basic summary statistics of the sample variables. We observe a substantial amount
of variation in prices, which touches on the core of our study, that is, whether reputation contributes
to providing a causal term for such rich variations in price. We observe only limited information on
sellers in the dataset, among which “total items” is the most important. Recall that it represents the
total number of items for sale in a particular online store (the seller). We view this variable as a proxy
for a seller’s scale and specialization. The significant variation observed in total items may reflect
the fact that seller heterogeneity is at work. The sales volume variable exhibits much less variation.
Lastly, the variation in the rate of good reviews indicates that it is less likely for sellers to get a bad or
neutral review than a good one.15 This is consistent with other empirical findings that only reviewers
who provide good reviews tend to break the silence. See, for example, Dellarocas and Wood (2008).
This pattern partially validates our theoretical model, in which a distribution that does not elicit good
reviews plays a central role in equilibrium pricing. Our focus on the left tail of the distribution becomes
more relevant.
4.2 Empirical analysis
First, we conduct testing for the existence of a change point in the data following the approach
suggested in Section 3.2. Table 3 reports the results. We first consider the test of the null hypothesis
of no change points for all quantiles between 0.1 and 0.9, i.e., T = [0.1, 0.9] in (3.5). The p-value for
such a test is 0.000 to ensure that we reject the null of no breaks at all conventional significance levels
14We also experiment with defining rookies as sellers with reputation scores below Category 4 or 6, but our major
empirical findings remain valid.
15The rate of good reviews is defined as the percentage of good reviews out of the total number of reviews.
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Table 3: Test for the Existence of Breaks
T Test stat p-value Critical value
10% 5% 1%
0.1 - 0.9 807.01 0.00 27.63 29.54 33.76
0.1 190.86 0.00 21.02 22.93 27.54
0.2 278.62 0.00 20.18 21.89 25.79
0.3 361.25 0.00 19.90 21.55 24.93
0.4 387.43 0.00 19.86 21.44 24.88
0.5 807.01 0.00 19.71 21.22 24.87
0.6 103.69 0.00 19.68 21.16 24.62
0.7 56.19 0.00 19.88 21.39 24.81
0.8 15.48 0.55 20.20 22.01 25.87
0.9 14.11 0.80 21.05 22.85 27.79
0.71 39.18 0.00 19.90 21.40 25.05
0.72 36.08 0.00 19.91 21.50 25.04
0.73 25.06 0.01 19.96 21.55 25.22
0.74 25.20 0.01 20.00 21.53 24.86
0.75 24.71 0.01 20.07 21.68 25.10
0.76 22.54 0.03 20.06 21.68 25.12
0.77 20.43 0.08 20.06 21.72 25.28
0.78 14.07 0.76 20.07 21.69 25.22
0.79 12.97 0.90 20.12 21.78 25.59
(1%, 5%, and 10%). Then, we test for several typical quantiles, i.e., T = {τ} in (3.5) for τ = 0.1, 0.2,
..., 0.9. Using the 5% nominal levels, we find that change points exist for quantiles up to 0.7 and that
the breaks do not occur for high quantiles (0.8 and 0.9). To take a closer look, we repeat the testing
procedure for quantiles between 0.7 and 0.8, from which we find that the structural breaks occur only
when τ ≤ 0.76 at the 5% nominal level.
Second, we estimate the model for the quantiles identified to have breaks. Table 4 reports the
parameter estimates for the typical quantiles, that is, τ = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.7. Figure 5 shows the plots
of the quantile regression line before and after the breaks for a number of representative quantiles.
Our estimates show that jumps occur among sellers at all quantiles under investigation. The size of
these jumps can be as significant as -370.79, which is about 37% of the mean price in the sample. The
estimated slope parameters before the jumps are small, and some are not statistically significant at
the 5% level. Nevertheless, we tend to have more significant slope estimates after the change point,
and the slope parameters after the jumps tend to be much larger in magnitude than those before the
jumps. These estimates justify our quantile regression approach. The heterogeneous pricing behavior
may reflect differences across sellers and market demand situations in online markets.
In making inferences for the estimates of γ0, one may notice that the asymptotic sampling distri-
butions depend on unknown parameters. This may in turn imply poor finite sample behavior if we
follow Theorem 3.5. Instead, we resort to the normalized LR test proposed in Theorem 3.6. Table 5
reports the 95% confidence intervals for the jump location estimates (γˆ). We find the upper bound
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Figure 5: Estimates of Quantile Regression
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Table 4: Estimation Results
τ Jump Size γ ατ βτ
intercept slope intercept slope
0.1 -197.88 3264 856.10 0.010 1006.98 -0.097
(6.21) (0.003) (34.15) (0.029)
0.2 -224.28 3264 947.22 -0.007 969.33 -0.083
(5.73) (0.003) (30.59) (0.025)
0.3 -265.17 3264 992.30 -0.005 967.87 -0.079
(6.04) (0.004) (43.50) (0.044)
0.4 -300.63 3264 1037.13 -0.008 735.55 -0.008
(6.4) (0.004) (42.03) (0.044)
0.5 -370.79 3264 1080.00 0.000 339.14 0.113
(6.53) (0.004) (42.61) (0.043)
0.6 -224.47 3240 1097.85 0.000 634.86 0.074
(6.02) (0.004) (44.00) (0.047)
0.7 -148.52 3364 1121.87 -0.007 584.56 0.108
(6.31) (0.004) (52.40) (0.050)
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and numbers in bold indicate that the
corresponding slope coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% level. All intercepts are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
24
Table 5: Inference on the Estimates of Breaks
τ γ 95% lower bound 95% upper bound
0.1 3264 3259 3271
0.2 3264 3259 3271
0.3 3264 3246 3271
0.4 3264 3246 3271
0.5 3264 3259 3271
0.6 3240 3232 3248
0.7 3364 3355 3367
0.1 - 0.5 3264 3259 3271
0.1 - 0.6 3252 3252 3252
mean regression 3240 3134 3272
for the 95% confidence intervals by inf{γ : γ > γˆ & NLR(γ) ≤ c0.95}, where c0.95 denotes the 0.95-
level critical value for Ξ. Accordingly, the lower bound for the 95% confidence intervals is defined by
sup{γ : γ < γˆ & NLR(γ) ≤ c0.95}. Clearly, for τ = 0.1−0.5, even though the estimates of the change
points are the same, the 95% confidence intervals may be different.
Based on the estimates in Table 4, we strong believe that the quantiles between 0.1 and 0.5 may
have a common structural break. Hence, we implement the testing methods discussed in Section 3.5.
These results are also reported in Table 5. The jump is estimated to occur at 3264. We then follow the
testing approach for LR1 in Theorem 3.8 to build up a 95% confidence interval for this estimate, which
coincides with the 95% confidence interval for τ = 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3. Finally, we implement the LR2
test in Theorem 3.8 for the quantiles between 0.1 and 0.6 because now we are not sure whether there
exists a common structural break and if so what value it takes. The estimate of γ0 is 3252. However,
the null hypothesis of a common break in this case is rejected at this estimate.
Two remarks are in order for a thorough empirical analysis. First, given the fact that we found
a common structural break among a few typical quantiles, one may wonder whether a least square
threshold regression can also identify the break. To address this concern, we estimate Hansen’s (2000)
least squares threshold model. The results are reported in the last row of Table 5. It suggests that
the estimated threshold in least squares mean regression differs from the most of the break estimates
in the quantile regression framework. Moreover, the confidence interval in the least square estimation
is much wider than those obtained in quantile regressions. The differences shed some lights on the
necessity of using quantile regression models for the consideration of heterogeneities.
Our second concern arises in line of the manipulation problem raised by McCrary (2008). McCrary
argued that some varieties of manipulation (e.g., complete manipulation) on the running variable in
RDD may lead to identification problems while others may not. He developed a test of manipulation
related to continuity of the running variable density function when the potential discontinuity point is
known. Here we follow McCrary (2008) closely to test the discontinuity of the density function of the
running variable (r) at the estimated cutoff point 3264 (for 0.1 ≤ τ ≤ 0.5). The estimated log difference
of the left and right density limits at this point is 2.5968 with a standard error of 0.3932, which suggests
25
a large t-ratio that rejects the null hypothesis of continuity at any conventional significance levels. Even
so, because the sellers do not have any complete control on the reputation score and the latter also has
idiosyncratic element which is determined by the buyers, the discontinuity at the density of reputation
score does not lead to identification problems for the optimal pricing strategy. (c.f. Footnote 4 in
McCrary, 2008.) On the contrary, we believe it offers partial support for our empirical analysis.
4.3 Robustness check
Although the goodwill pricing pattern is found in the data, there remain critical issues in the foregoing
empirical analysis. First, we did not consider the possible impact of the observed covariates on the
posting prices. As a robustness check, we repeat the previous empirical exercises by including all
observed variables.16
Following the testing approach suggested in Section 3.2, we detect the existence of change points
in the data for all of the quantiles between 0.1 and 0.9. We then estimate the model for quantiles
τ = 0.1, ..., 0.9. The estimation and inference results are reported in Table 6.
The jump sizes are evaluated at the mean values of each covariate in the quantile regressions. It is
observed that the price-cut pattern occurs for all τ ∈ [0.2, 0.9], and the jump sizes are much smaller
than those unconditional on the covariates. Moreover, roughly speaking, the larger the τ , the higher
the reputation level at which the jump occurs (that is the closer to the exogenous cutoff of goodwill).
Although jumps are identified in the quantiles of τ = 0.8, 0.9, they are smaller in magnitude. What
can be concluded is that for the sellers in most of the quantiles, a price-cut strategy may be useful
when their reputation scores are in the range of 3200 to 3400.
A jump-up occurs at the quantile regression of τ = 0.1. This inconsistent finding may indicate that
sellers posting extremely low prices may possibly have objectives other than an enhanced reputation.
If this is indeed the case, then our model cannot, in general, explain the pricing behavior of these
sellers.
Our choice of the iPod Nano for this study stemmed from our concern with product homogeneity.
An additional concern is whether a seller would choose this product to accrue good reviews to obtain
the goodwill benefit. To address this issue, we repeat the testing and estimation procedure with a much
more restrictive sample, that is, the sellers with fewer than 100 items in total to sell. These sellers
are smaller in scale and possibly more specialized in selling electronic items. Our major findings on
the pricing patterns remain valid with this restrictive sample. However, we also acknowledge that this
issue may be significantly more complicated. In particular, consumers’ willingness to provide positive
reviews in exchange for lower prices may be dependent on product-specific characteristics. The issue
of consumer responsiveness to this type of product is beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore
left for future research.
16We also considered including r2 in the QRTM but found its coefficient not to be significantly different from 0 at the
10% level for all quantiles under investigation. We thus decided to augment our QRTM in the previous subsection only
by the covariates listed in Table 2.
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Table 6: Estimation and Inference of Structural Breaks
τ Jump Size γ 95% lower bound 95% upper bound
0.1 277.68 1984 1975 2018
0.2 -77.83 3264 3231 3271
0.3 -125.60 2979 2975 3002
0.4 -101.01 3252 3232 3272
0.5 -52.38 3252 3247 3261
0.6 -87.07 3252 3232 3272
0.7 -64.23 3252 3247 3261
0.8 -28.00 3364 3355 3367
0.9 -27.64 3849 3750 3947
5 Conclusion
We investigate the pricing strategy that an online seller may employ when the concern for goodwill
exerts an effect on the pricing decision. In theory, such pricing entails a price reduction at a reputation
level threshold. A mechanical reason may be that sellers switch between the local extremes of the profit
function, which, accordingly, are determined by the shape features on the underlying distributions. In
connection with our model prediction, we herein propose a threshold quantile regression-based testing
and estimation framework to identify and make inferences on this particular pricing strategy. We then
apply the proposed methodology to Taobao.com and find both heterogeneities and jumps in sellers’
pricing strategies for goodwill.
There are a few dimensions along which this work could be extended. First, we provide a simple
but interesting theoretical model to explain the estimated pricing pattern in the data. Determining
both whether other mechanisms can predict the same pricing strategy and which alternative caters
best for the application is important to understanding the reputation effect on Internet markets. Doing
so is beyond the scope of this paper, but is certainly worth exploring.
Second, in terms of heterogeneity, we consider and document only the across-quantile difference in
posting prices. However, determining what drives these differences among sellers would certainly be
an interesting issue to pursue. Unfortunately, due to the limited information on the seller side in the
current dataset, we are restrained from looking into this issue in this paper.
Third, we adopt a parametric threshold quantile regression framework to investigate the functional
relationship between prices and reputation levels in this paper. Even though we examine the validity of
the pricing pattern with the specification of polynomial forms, a more flexible nonparametric approach
(e.g., Oka, 2010) seems an appealing direction for future research. Product differentiation may be yet
another interesting extension. We leave these for future research.
6 Appendix: Proof of the main results
To prove the main results in Section 3, we first define some notation. Recall zi ≡ (x′i, ri)′ if ri /∈ xi and
zi ≡ xi otherwise, zi (γτ ) ≡ [x′i1 {ri ≤ γτ} x′i1 {ri > γτ}]′, ψτ (u) ≡ τ−1 (u < 0) , θτ ≡ (θ′1τ , γτ )′, θ1τ ≡
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(α′τ , β
′
τ )
′, and the true value of θτ , θ1τ , ατ , βτ , and γτ are denoted as θ0τ , θ
0
1τ , α
0
τ , β
0
τ , and γ
0
τ , respectively.
Let
εiτ (θτ ) ≡ yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ) and εiτ = εiτ
(
θ0τ
)
. (6.1)
Note that the τth conditional quantile of εiτ = εiτ
(
θ0τ
)
given zi is 0, i.e., E [ψτ (εiτ ) |zi] = 0. Let
Snτ (θτ ) =
n∑
i=1
ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ )) . (6.2)
Let ‖·‖ denote the Euclidean norm. Note that for all θτ ∈ R2k+1, we have ‖zi (γτ )‖ = ‖xi‖ ,
|θ′1τzi (γτ )| ≤ ‖θ1τ‖ ‖xi‖ , and |θ′1τzi (γτ )− θ
∗′
1τzi (γτ ) | ≤ ‖θ1τ − θ∗1τ‖ ‖xi‖ , and
‖zi (γτ )− zi (γ∗τ )‖ ≤
√
2 ‖xi‖ 1 {γτ ∧ γ∗τ < ri ≤ γτ ∨ γ∗τ} ≤
√
2 ‖xi‖ 1 {|ri − γτ | ≤ |γ∗τ − γτ |} . (6.3)
We use C to denote a generic large positive constant whose exact value may change across lines.
We now state and prove some lemmata that are used in later proofs.
Lemma 6.1 limη→0E supθ∗τ∈Nη(θτ )
∣∣ρτ (yi − θ∗′1τzi (γ∗τ ))− ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ))∣∣ = 0 for any θτ ∈ Θ,
where Nη (θτ ) ≡ {θ∗τ = (θ∗′1τ , γ∗τ )′ ∈ Θ : ‖θ∗1τ − θ1τ‖ < η, |γ∗τ − γτ | < η} denotes an η-neighborhood of
θτ ∈ Θ and η > 0.
Proof. Let ∆iτ ≡ θ∗′1τzi (γ∗τ )− θ′1τzi (γτ ) . Then by the triangle inequality and (6.3),
|∆iτ | ≤ |θ′1τ [zi (γτ )− zi (γ∗τ )]|+
∣∣(θ1τ − θ∗1τ )′ zi (γ∗τ )∣∣
≤
{√
2× 1 {γτ ∧ γ∗τ < ri ≤ γτ ∨ γ∗τ} ‖θ1τ‖+ ‖θ1τ − θ∗1τ‖
}
‖xi‖
≤
{√
2× 1 {|ri − γτ | ≤ |γτ − γ∗τ |} ‖θ1τ‖+ ‖θ1τ − θ∗1τ‖
}
‖xi‖
≤
{√
2× 1 {|ri − γτ | ≤ η} ‖θ1τ‖+ η
}
‖xi‖ .
By Knight’s (1998) identity (see also Koenker (2005, p. 121)),
ρτ
(
yi − θ∗′1τzi (γ∗τ )
)
− ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ )) = ρτ (εiτ (θτ )−∆iτ )− ρτ (εiτ (θτ ))
= −∆iτψτ (εiτ (θτ )) +
∫ ∆iτ
0
[1 {uiτ ≤ s} − 1 {uiτ ≤ 0}] ds.
It follows that
E sup
θ∗τ∈Nη(θτ )
∣∣∣ρτ (yi − θ∗′1τzi (γ∗τ ))− ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ))∣∣∣
≤ 2E |∆iτ | ≤ 2
√
2P (|ri − γτ | ≤ η)1/2 ‖xi‖2 ‖θ1τ‖+ η ‖xi‖+ 2ηE ‖xi‖ → 0
as η → 0, where ‖xi‖2 ≡ {E ‖xi‖2}1/2.
Let Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) ≡ Sn (θ1τ , γτ )− Sn
(
θ01τ , γ
0
τ
)
, D1nτ (w1) ≡ Sn
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ
)− Sn (θ01τ , γ0τ) ,
and Dn2 (θ1τ , γτ ) ≡ Sn (θ1τ , γτ )− Sn
(
θ1τ , γ
0
τ
)
. Then we have
Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) = D1nτ
(
n1/2(θ1τ − θ01τ )
)
+D2nτ (θ1τ , γτ ) . (6.4)
Let D¯2nτ (w1, w2) ≡ D2nτ
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
. The following two lemmas study the
asymptotic properties of D1nτ (w1) and D¯2nτ (w1, w2) .
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Lemma 6.2 For every M ∈ (0,∞) , we have sup‖w1‖≤M |D1nτ (w1) + n−1/2w′1
∑n
i=1 zi
(
γ0τ
)
ψτ (εiτ )
− 12w′1Ω1τw1| = oP (1) where Ω1τ ≡ Ω1
(
τ, γ0τ
)
= E[zi
(
γ0τ
)
zi
(
γ0τ
)′
f
(
θ0′1τzi
(
γ0τ
) |zi)].
Proof. Let d1nτ (w1) ≡ D1nτ (w1) +n−1/2w′1
∑n
i=1 zi
(
γ0τ
)
ψτ (εiτ )− 12w′1Ω1τw1. By Knight’s iden-
tity,
D1nτ (w1) =
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ − n−1/2w′1zi
(
γ0τ
))− ρτ (εiτ )]
= −n−1/2w′1
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0τ
)
ψτ (εiτ ) + n
−1/2w′1
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0τ
) ∫ 1
0
pii (w1, s) ds,
where pii (w1, s) = 1{εiτ ≤ sn−1/2w′1zi
(
γ0τ
)} − 1 {εiτ ≤ 0} . It follows that
d1nτ (w1) = n
−1/2w′1
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0τ
) ∫ 1
0
pii (w1, s) ds− 1
2
w′1Ω1τw1
=
∫ 1
0
n−1/2
n∑
i=1
[
w′1zi
(
γ0τ
)
pii (w1, s)− sn−1/2w′1Ω1τw1
]
ds
=
∫ 1
0
n−1/2
n∑
i=1
w′1zi
(
γ0τ
) {pii (w1, s)− E [pii (w1, s) |zi]} ds
+
∫ 1
0
n−1/2
n∑
i=1
{
w′1zi
(
γ0τ
)
E [pii (w1, s) |zi]− sn−1/2w′1Ω1τw1
}
ds
≡ d1nτ,1 (w1) + d1nτ,2 (w1) .
The pointwise convergence of d1nτ,1 (w1) can be established by the Chebyshev inequality. Its uni-
form convergence results follows from similar arguments as used in the proof of Lemma 1 in Su and
Xiao (2008). For d1nτ,2 (w1) we apply the Taylor expansion with integral remainder and the triangle
inequality to obtain
sup
‖w1‖≤b
|d1nτ,2 (w1)|
= sup
‖w1‖≤b
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2w′1
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0τ
) ∫ 1
0
[
F
(
ςiτ + sn
−1/2w′1zi
(
γ0τ
) |zi)− F (ςiτ |zi)] ds− 1
2
w′1Ω1τw1
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
‖w1‖≤b
∣∣∣∣∣n−1w′1
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0τ
)
zi
(
γ0τ
)′
w1
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
[
f
(
ςiτ + stn
−1/2w′1zi
(
γ0τ
) |zi)− f (ςiτ |zi)] dtds
∣∣∣∣∣
+
1
2
sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1w′1
n∑
i=1
[
zi
(
γ0τ
)
zi
(
γ0τ
)′
f (ςiτ |zi)− Ω1τ
]
w1
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣M2n−1
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥zi (γ0τ) zi (γ0τ)′∥∥∥∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣f (ςiτ + stn−1/2w′1zi (γ0τ) |zi)− f (ςiτ |zi)∣∣∣ dtds
∣∣∣∣∣
+
M2
2
∥∥∥∥∥n−1
n∑
i=1
[
zi
(
γ0τ
)
zi
(
γ0τ
)′
f (ςiτ |zi)− Ω1τ
]∥∥∥∥∥
= oP (1) + oP (1) = oP (1) ,
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where ςiτ ≡ θ0′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
, and the last line follows from the dominated convergence theorem and the
weak law of large numbers (LLN).
Lemma 6.3 Let w2 ∈ R. For every M ∈ (0,∞) , we have sup‖w1‖≤M
∣∣D¯2nτ (w1, w2)− D¯2nτ (0, w2)∣∣ =
oP (1) .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider the case w2 > 0. Let 1i (r) ≡ 1
{
γ0τ < ri ≤ γ0τ + r
}
.
Let r ≡ γτ−γ0τ and ∆1τ ≡ θ1τ−θ01τ , a1 (x) ≡ (01×p, x′)′, a2 (x) ≡ (x′,01×p)′ and a (x) ≡ a1 (x)−a2 (x) ,
where 01×p denotes a 1× p vector of zeros. Noting that zi (γτ )− zi
(
γ0τ
)
= −a (xi) 1i (r) when r > 0,
we observe that: (i) if 1i (r) = 0,
yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ) = εiτ − θ0′1τ
[
zi (γτ )− zi
(
γ0τ
)]−∆′1τ [zi (γτ )− zi (γ0τ)]−∆′1τzi (γ0τ)
= εiτ −∆′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
= yi − θ′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
;
and (ii) if 1i (r) = 1, zi
(
γ0τ
)
= a1 (xi) and zi (γτ ) = a2 (xi) . It follows that if r > 0, then
17
ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ))− ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
)
=
[
ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ))− ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
)
]
1i (r)
=
{
ρτ
(
εiτ − θ0′1τ
[
zi (γτ )− zi
(
γ0τ
)]−∆′1τzi (γτ ))− ρτ (εiτ −∆′1τzi (γ0τ))} 1i (r)
=
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)−∆′1τa2 (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ −∆′1τa1 (xi))] 1i (r) . (6.5)
By Knight’s identity, we have
D¯2nτ (w1, w2)− D¯2nτ (0, w2)
= D2nτ
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
−D2nτ
(
θ01τ , γ
0
τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
=
n∑
i=1
{
[ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)− n−1/2w′1a2 (xi)
)
− ρτ (εiτ )]
− [ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ )]
−[ρτ
(
εiτ − n−1/2w′1a1 (xi)
)
− ρτ (εiτ )]
}
1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)
= n−1/2
n∑
i=1
ψτ (εiτ )w
′
1a (xi) 1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)
+
n∑
i=1
∫ −θ0′1τa(xi)+n−1/2w′1a2(xi)
−θ0′1τa(xi)
[1 {εiτ ≤ s} − 1 {εiτ ≤ 0}] ds 1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)
−
n∑
i=1
∫ n−1/2w′1a1(xi)
0
[1 {εiτ ≤ s} − 1 {εiτ ≤ 0}] ds1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)
≡ d2nτ,1 (w1) + d2nτ,2 (w1)− d2nτ,3 (w1) , say.
To study the uniform bound for d2nτ,1 (w1) , we consider the class of functions
F1 = {m1 (y, z; w1, γ) : w1 ∈ ΘM , γ ∈ Γ} ,
17Similarly, if r < 0, then we can show that ρτ
(
yi − θ′1τ m˙γτ (zi)
) − ρτ (yi − θ′1τ m˙γ0τ (zi)) = [ρτ (εiτ −θ0′1τa (xi)
−∆′1τa1 (xi))− ρτ
(
εiτ −∆′1τa2 (xi)
)
]1¯i (r) , where 1¯i (r) = 1
{
γ0τ + r < qi ≤ γ0τ
}
.
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where m1 (y, z; w1, γ) = ψτ (y − θ0′1τz (γ))w′1a (x) 1 {q ≤ γ} , z (γ) = [x′1 {q ≤ γ} x′1 {q > γ}]′ , and
ΘM = {ω1 : ‖ω1‖ ≤M} . Let
F1,1 = {f1,1 (y, z; γ) = 1 {q ≤ γ} : γ ∈ Γ} ,
F1,2 =
{
f1,2 (y, z; γ) = τ − 1
{
y − θ0′1τz (γ) < 0
}
: γ ∈ Γ} ,
F1,3 = {f1,3 (y, z;w1) = w′1a (x) : w1 ∈ ΘM} .
By Lemma 2.6.15 of Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, hereafter VW), F1,1 is a VC-subgraph class.
Noting that θ0′1τz (γ) = β
0′
τ x + δ
0′
τ x1 {q ≤ γ} where δ0τ = α0τ − β0τ , F1,2 is also a VC-subgraph class
by Lemma 2.6.15(viii) of VW. F1,3 is Euclidean for the envelope C ‖x‖ by Theorem 2.7.11 of VW
or Lemma 2.13 of Pakes and Pollard (1989, PP hereafter). Noting that the VC-subgraph class is
Euclidean for every envelope and the product of Euclidean classes of functions is also Euclidean (see
Lemmas 2.13 and 2.14(iii) of PP), we conclude that F1 = F1,1 · F1,2 · F1,3 is Euclidean. Then by
Assumption A2 and Lemma 2.17 of PP we have
sup
‖w1‖≤M
|d2nτ,1 (w1)| = sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2
n∑
i=1
[
m1
(
yi, zi; w1, γ
0
τ + n
−1+2aw2
)−m1 (yi, zi; w1, γ0τ)]
∣∣∣∣∣ = oP (1)
as n−1+2a → 0 as n→∞ by Assumption A7.
Next we study d2nτ,3 (w1) . Write d2nτ,3 (w1) = n
−1/2∑n
i=1 w
′
1a1 (xi)
∫ 1
0
[1
{
εiτ ≤ n−1/2w′1a1 (xi) s
}
−1 {εiτ ≤ 0}]ds 1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)
. Let m2 (y, z; w1, w¯1) = w
′
1a1 (x)
∫ 1
0
1
{
y − θ0′1τz (γ) ≤ w¯′1a1 (x) s
} ×
1{γ0τ < q ≤ γ0τ + n−1+2aw2}. We consider the class of functions
F2 = {m2 (y, z; w1, w¯1) : w1 ∈ ΘM , w¯1 ∈ ΘM} .
Let
F2,1 =
{
f2,2 (y, z; w¯1) =
∫ 1
0
1
{
y − θ0′1τz
(
γ0τ
) ≤ w¯′1a1 (x) s} ds : w¯1 ∈ ΘM} .
By Andrews (1994, p. 2270), both F1,3 and F2,1 belong to the type I class of functions and satisfy the
Pollard’s entropy condition. Noting that F2 can be written as the product of F1,3, F2,1, and a fixed
indicator function 1
{
γ0τ < q ≤ γ0τ + n−1+2aw2
}
, it also satisfies that Pollard’s entropy condition and
is stochastically equicontinuous with respect to the pseudometric defined by
ρ ((w1, w¯1) , (w
∗
1 , w¯
∗
1)) =
{
E
[
|m2 (yi, zi; w1, w¯1)−m2 (yi, zi; w∗1 , w¯∗1)|2
]}1/2
.
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Consequently, letting m2 (yi, zi; w1, w¯1) = m2 (yi, zi; w1, w¯1)− E [m2 (yi, zi; w1, w¯1)] , we have
sup
‖w1‖≤M
|d2nτ,3 (w1)|
≤ sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2
n∑
i=1
E
[
m2
(
yi, zi; w1, n
−1/2w1
)
−m2 (yi, zi; w1, 0)
]∣∣∣∣∣
+ sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2
n∑
i=1
[
m¯2
(
yi, zi; w1, n
−1/2w1
)
− m¯2 (yi, zi; w1, 0)
]∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2
n∑
i=1
E
[
m2
(
yi, zi; w1, n
−1/2w1
)
−m2 (yi, zi; w1, 0)
]∣∣∣∣∣+ oP (1)
= sup
‖w1‖≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2
n∑
i=1
E
{
w′1a1 (xi)
∫ 1
0
[
F
(
n−1/2w′1a1 (xi) s| zi
)
− F (0|zi)
]
ds 1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)}∣∣∣∣∣+ oP (1)
≤M
∣∣∣∣∣n−1/2
n∑
i=1
E
{
‖a1 (xi)‖
∫ 1
0
[
F
(
n−1/2M ‖a1 (xi)‖ s | zi
)
− F (0|zi)
]
ds 1i
(
n−1+2aw2
)}∣∣∣∣∣+ oP (1)
≤Mn1/2
∥∥∥∥‖a1 (xi)‖∫ 1
0
[
F
(
n−1/2M ‖a1 (xi)‖ s | zi
)
− F (0|zi)
]
ds
∥∥∥∥
2
∥∥1i (n−1+2aw2)∥∥2 + oP (1)
= n1/2O
(
n−1/2
)
o
(
n−1+2a
)
+ oP (1) = oP (1) ,
where ‖A‖2 ≡ {E ‖A‖2}1/2.
By the same token, we can show that sup‖w1‖≤M |d2nτ,2 (w1)| = oP (1) . This completes the proof
of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.3
First, observe that θˆτ is also minimizing S¯nτ (θτ ) ≡ n−1
∑n
i=1 sτ (yi, zi; θτ ) , where sτ (yi, zi; θτ ) ≡
ρτ (yi −θ′1τzi (γτ ))−ρτ
(
yi − θ0′1τzi
(
γ0τ
))
. Let ∆ (zi, θτ ) ≡ θ′1τzi (γτ )−θ0′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
and ςτ (θτ ) ≡ E [sτ (yi, zi; θτ )] .
Then by Knight’s identity, the compactness of Θ1 and Assumption A2, E |sτ (yi, xi; θτ )| ≤ 2E |∆ (zi, θτ )| ≤
2 (‖ατ‖+ ‖βτ‖)E ‖xi‖ <∞. This ensures that Sn (θτ ) = ςτ (θτ )+oa.s. (1) for each θτ ∈ Θ by the strong
LLN. By the proof of Lemma 2 in Galvao et al. (2011), the class of functions F = {sτ (y, z; θ) : θ ∈ Θ}is
Glivenko-Cantelli. It follows that S¯nτ (θτ ) = ςτ (θτ ) + oa.s. (1) uniformly in θτ ∈ Θ.
Let lτ (c) ≡ E [ρτ (εiτ − c)− ρτ (εiτ )] . Knight’s identity implies lτ (c) > 0 for any c 6= 0. Then by
the law of iterated expectations and Assumption A6, we have
ςτ (θτ ) = E [E [ρτ (εiτ −∆ (zi, θτ ))− ρτ (εiτ ) |zi]] = E [lτ (∆ (zi, θτ ))] > 0 for all θτ 6= θ0τ .
By Lemma (6.1) ςτ (θτ ) is continuous in θτ . It follows that θ
0
τ is the unique minimizer of ςτ (θτ ) and
θˆτ → θˆτ a.s. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2 in Koul et al. (2003), so we only sketch the main
difference. Let Ω (σ) ≡ {θτ ∈ Θ :
∥∥θ1τ − θ01τ∥∥ < σ, ∣∣γτ − γ0τ ∣∣ < σ}, where σ ∈ (0, 1) can be chosen
sufficiently small by Theorem 3.3. Let b ∈ (0,∞) . Define
N1b ≡ {θτ ∈ Ω (σ) :
∣∣γτ − γ0τ ∣∣ > bn2a−1} and N2b ≡ {θτ ∈ Ω (σ) : ∥∥θ1τ − θ01τ∥∥ > bn−1/2}.
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Noting that infθτ∈N1b∪N2b Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) = min {infθτ∈N1b Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) , infθτ∈N2b Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ )} , one
can prove the theorem by showing that for any κ ∈ (0, 1], c1 ∈ (0,∞) and c2 ∈ (0,∞) , there exists
b ∈ (0,∞) and n0 such that
P
(
inf
θτ∈Njb
Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) > cj
)
> 1− κ for n > n0, j = 1, 2, (6.6)
because then infθτ∈N1b∪N2b Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) > c1 ∧ c2 > 0 with positive probability, implying that θˆτ /∈
N1b ∪N2b as Dnτ (θˆ1τ , γˆτ ) ≡ Snτ (θˆ1τ , γˆτ )− Snτ
(
θ01τ , γ
0
τ
)
< 0 by the definition of θˆτ = (θˆ
′
1τ , γˆτ )
′.
Noting that for j = 1, 2,
inf
θτ∈Njb
Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) ≥ inf
θτ∈Njb
D1nτ
(
n1/2(θ1τ − θ01τ )
)
+ inf
θτ∈Njb
D2nτ (θ1τ , γτ ) ≡ Dnτ,j1 +Dnτ,j2, say,
it suffices to analyze Dnτ,11, Dnτ,12, Dnτ,21, and Dnτ,22.
We first analyze Dnτ,12. By Koul et al. (2003) it suffices to show that for all κ ∈ (0, 1], c1 ∈ (0,∞) ,
there exists c0 <∞, b0 ∈ (0,∞) , σ ∈ (0, 1) and n0 such that c0b0g
(
γ0τ
)
/2 > c1 and that
P
(
inf
θτ∈Njb
D2nτ (θ1τ , γτ )
nK (|γτ − γ0τ |)
> c0
)
> 1− κ/2 for all n > n0, (6.7)
where K (r) ≡ E [1i (r)] and 1i (r) ≡ 1
{
γ0τ < ri ≤ γ0τ + r
}
. Let r ≡ γτ − γ0τ and ∆1τ ≡ θ1τ − θ01τ .
Without loss of generality, assume that r > 0. Then by (6.5) we can decompose n−1D2nτ (θ1τ , γτ ) as
follows
n−1D2nτ (θ1τ , γτ ) = n−1
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi (γτ ))− ρτ (yi − θ′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)
)
]
= n−1
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)−∆′1τa2 (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ −∆′1τa1 (xi))] 1i (r)
= n−1
n∑
i=1
[ρτ (εiτ )− ρτ (εiτ −∆′1τa1 (xi))] 1i (r)
+ n−1
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)−∆′1τa2 (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ + θ0′1τa (xi))] 1i (r)
+ n−1
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ )− p (ri)] 1i (r)
+ n−1
n∑
i=1
[
p (ri)− p
(
γ0τ
)]
1i (r) + p
(
γ0τ
)
[Kn (r)−K (r)] + p
(
γ0τ
)
K (r)
≡ dnτ1 (θ1τ , r) + dnτ2 (θ1τ , r) + dnτ3 (r) + dnτ4 (r) + dnτ5 (r) + dnτ6 (r) , say,
where p
(
γ0τ
)
= E{[ρτ (εiτ + θ0′1τa (xi))− ρτ (εiτ )] |ri = γ0τ} andKn (r) = n−1∑ni=1 1i (r) . By Knight’s
identity, the law of iterated expectations, and Fubini’s theorem, we can readily show that p (γ) is
strictly positive and continuous in γ under our assumptions. Following Koul et al. (2003) and Hansen
(2000) we can show that the first five terms in the last decomposition are asymptotically negligible
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in comparison with K (r) uniformly on N1b by modifying the proof of their Lemma 3.2 to accom-
modate our definition of N1b. For example, we need to prove Claim (i) below in order to analyze
dnτ4 (r) and dnτ5 (r) because then supB/n1−2a≤r≤σ |dnτ4 (r) /K (r)| ≤ sup0≤r≤σ |p
(
γ0τ + r
) − p (γ0τ) |
supB/n1−2a≤r≤σ |Kn (r) /K (r) | → 0 and supB/n1−2a≤r≤σ |dnτ5 (r) /K (r)| ≤ C supB/n1−2a≤r≤σ |Kn (r)
/K (r)− 1| → 0 and by passing n→∞ and then σ → 0. Similarly, Claim (ii) below is needed to show
that dnτ3 (θ1τ , r) /K (r) is asymptotically negligible on the set N1b.
Claim. For each κ > 0, c > 0, there exists a constant B ∈ (0,∞) such that for all σ ∈ (0, 1) and
n ≥ [B/σ] + 1, we have
(i) P
(
supB/n1−2a≤r≤σ
∣∣∣Kn(r)K(r) − 1∣∣∣ < c) > 1− κ,
(ii) P
(
supB/n1−2a≤r≤σ
∣∣∣Rn(r)K(r) ∣∣∣ < c) > 1− κ,
where Rn (r) = n
−1∑n
i=1{J (xi, εiτ )−E [J (xi, εiτ ) |ri = r]}1i (r) and J (xi, εiτ ) ≡ ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)
)−
ρτ (εiτ ) .
It follows that n−1D2nτ (θ1τ , γτ ) /K (r) = p
(
γ0τ
)
+ oP (1) > c > 0 with probability approaching 1
as n→∞ uniformly in θτ ∈ N1b, and thus (6.7) follows.
The analyses of Dnτ,11, Dnτ,12, and Dnτ,22 are analogous to those of the corresponding terms in
the proof of Theorem 3.2 in Koul et al. (2003) and thus omitted. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5
(i) By Theorem 3.4, it suffices to study the asymptotic behavior of Dnτ (θ1τ , γτ ) by restricting our
attention to the case where n1/2
∥∥θ1τ − θ01τ∥∥ ≤ M and n1−2a ∣∣γτ − γ0τ ∣∣ ≤ M for some large but fixed
positive number M. Let w1nτ ≡ n1/2(θˆ1τ − θ01τ ) and w2nτ ≡ n1−2a
(
γˆτ − γ0τ
)
. Then by (6.4),
Dnτ
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
= D1nτ (w1) + D¯2nτ (w1, w2)
where recall D¯2nτ (w1, w2, ) = D2nτ
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
. By Lemmata 6.2 and 6.3, we
have
Dnτ
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
= D¯1nτ (w1) + D¯2nτ (0, w2) + oP (1) ,
where oP (1) holds uniformly over the set ‖w1‖ ≤M and |w2| ≤M, D¯1nτ (w1) = −n−1/2w′1
∑n
i=1 zi
(
γ0τ
)
×ψτ (εiτ ) + 12w′1Ω1τw1, and
D¯2nτ (0, w2) =
{ ∑n
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τa (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ )] 1i (n−1+2aw2) if w2 > 0∑n
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ − θ0′1τa (xi)
)− ρτ (εiτ )] 1¯i (n−1+2aw2) if w2 ≤ 0 . (6.8)
Thus Dnτ (θˆ1τ , γˆτ ) = D1nτ (w1n) + D¯2nτ (w1n, w2n) = D¯1nτ (w1n) + D¯2nτ (0, w2n) + oP (1) . Noting
that D¯1nτ (w1) and D¯2nτ (0, w2) are free of w2 and w1, respectively, and (w1n, w2n) is a minimizer of
Dnτ
(
θ01τ + n
−1/2w1, γ0τ + n
−1+2aw2
)
with respect to (w1, w2) , the asymptotic distribution of w1n is
determined by that of the minimizer of D¯1nτ (w1) with respect to w1, and similarly the asymptotic
distribution of w2n is determined by that of the minimizer of D¯2nτ (0, w2) with respect to w2.
Noting that D¯1nτ (w1) is convex in w1, we can readily apply the convexity lemma to obtain
w1nτ = n
−1/2Ω−11τ
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0τ
)
ψτ (εiτ ) + oP (1)
d→ N (02k×1, τ (1− τ) Σ (τ, γ0τ)) .
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where recall Σ (τ, γ) = Ω1 (τ, γ)
−1
Ω0 (γ, γ) Ω1 (τ, γ)
−1
. This proves (i).
We now prove (ii). By reversing the argument used to obtain (6.5) we find that it is convenient to
rewrite D¯2nτ (0, w2) as
D¯2nτ (0, w2) =
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + θ
0′
1τzi
(
γ0τ
)− θ0′1τzi (γ0τ + n−1+2aw2))− ρτ (εiτ )]
=
n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + δ
0′
τ ∆xi (w2)
)− ρτ (εiτ )] ,
where ∆xi (w2) = xi
[
1
{
ri ≤ γ0τ + n−1+2aw2
}− 1{ri ≤ γ0τ}] and (recall) δ0τ = δ0nτ = α0nτ − β0nτ =
vτn
−a. Using Knight’s identity,
D¯2nτ (0, w2) =
n∑
i=1
ψτ (εiτ ) δ
0′
τ ∆xi (w2) +
n∑
i=1
∫ −δ0′τ ∆xi(w2)
0
[1 {εiτ ≤ s} − 1 {εiτ ≤ 0}] ds
≡ D¯2nτ,1 (w2) + D¯2nτ,2 (w2) , say.
Assume that w2 > 0. Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Lemma A.11 in Hansen
(2000), we can readily show that
D¯2nτ,1 (w2)⇒ Bτ (w2) ,
where Bτ (w2) is a Brownian motion with variance E[Bτ (1)
2
] = v′τE[xix
′
i|ri = γ0τ ]vτ g
(
γ0τ
) ≡ λτ .
Analogously to the proof of Lemma 6.3 and using arguments as used in the proof of Lemma A.10 in
Hansen (2000), we can show that uniformly in w2 on a compact set
D¯2nτ,2 (w2) = −
n∑
i=1
δ0′τ ∆xi (w2)
∫ 1
0
[
F
(
θ0′1τzi
(
γ0τ
)− sδ0′τ ∆xi (w2) |zi)− F (θ0′1τzi (γ0τ) |zi)] ds+ oP (1)
= δ0′τ
n∑
i=1
f
(
α0′τ xi|zi
)
∆xi (w2) ∆xi (w2)
′
δ0τ + oP (1) = µτ |w2|+ oP (1) ,
where µτ ≡ v′τE[f
(
α0′τ xi|zi
)
xix
′
i|ri = γ0τ ]vτg
(
γ0τ
)
. Noting that Bτ (w2) is a Brownian motion with
variance λτ and thus can be written as −
√
λτW1 (w2) with W1 (w2) being a standard Brownian motion,
we have,
D¯2nτ (0, w2)⇒ µτ |w2| −
√
λτW1 (w2) if w2 > 0. (6.9)
Similarly, we can show that
D¯2nτ (0, w2)⇒ µτ |w2| −
√
λτW2 (−w2) if w2 ≤ 0, (6.10)
where W2 (w2) is a standard Brownian motion that is independent of W1 (w2) . Then by the continuous
mapping theorem (CMT) and following the proof of Theorem 1 in Hansen (2000), we have
w2nτ
d→ arg max
−∞<w2<∞
−
{
µτ |w2|+
√
λτW (w2)
}
=
λτ
4µ2τ
arg max
−∞<r<∞
−
{
µτ
∣∣∣∣ λτ4µ2τ r
∣∣∣∣+√λτW ( λτ4µ2τ r
)}
=
λτ
4µ2τ
arg max
−∞<r<∞
{
− λτ
4µτ
|r|+ λ
2µτ
W (r)
}
=
λτ
4µ2τ
arg max
−∞<r<∞
{
−1
2
|r|+W (r)
}
, (6.11)
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by the change of variables w2 =
(
λτ/(4µ
2
τ )
)
r and the distributional equality W
(
c2r
) ≡ cW (r) . 18
(iii) follows from the direct asymptotic covariance calculations. 
Proof of Theorem 3.6
Recall that w1nτ ≡ n1/2(θˆ1τ−θ01τ ) and w2nτ ≡ n1−2a
(
γˆτ − γ0τ
)
. Let w¯1nτ ≡ n1/2
(
θˆ1
(
τ, γ0τ
)− θ01τ) .
By (6.4), the relationship between D2nτ and D¯2nτ , and Lemma 6.3, we have
LRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
= [D1nτ (w¯1nτ )−D1nτ (w1nτ )] +
[
D¯2nτ (w¯1nτ , 0))− D¯2nτ (w1nτ , w2nτ ))
]
= [D1nτ (w¯1nτ )−D1nτ (w1nτ )]− D¯2nτ (0, w2nτ ) + oP (1) .
By the proofs of Theorems 3.5(i) and 3.7(ii) below (assuming T = {τ}), w1nτ and w¯1nτ are asymptot-
ically equivalent, implying that D1nτ (w¯1nτ )−D1nτ (w1nτ ) = oP (1) by the CMT. This, in conjunction
with the analysis of D¯2nτ (0, w2) in the the proof of Theorem 3.5(ii) and the CMT, implies that
LRnτ
(
γ0τ
)
= −D¯2nτ (0, w2nτ ) + oP (1) d→ sup
w2
{
−µτ |w2|+
√
λτW (w2)
}
(6.12)
By the change of variables w2 =
(
λτ/(4µ
2
τ )
)
r and the distributional equality W
(
c2r
) ≡ cW (r) , we
have
sup
w2
−
{
µτ |w2|+
√
λτW (w2)
}
= sup
r
{
−µτ
∣∣∣∣ λτ4µ2τ r
∣∣∣∣+√λτW ( λτ4µ2τ r
)}
=
λτ
4µτ
sup
r
{− |r|+ 2W (r)} . (6.13)
Consequently, we have LRnτ
(
γ0τ
) d→ λτ4µτ supr {− |r|+ 2W (r)} . 
Proof of Theorem 3.7
(i) First, observe that θˆ1 (τ, γ) defined in (3.9) is also minimizing S¯n (θ1, τ, γ) ≡ n−1
∑n
i=1 s (yi, zi; θ1, τ, γ)
with respect to θ1, where s (yi, zi; θ1, τ, γ) ≡ ρτ (yi − θ′1zi (γ))− ρτ
(
yi − θ0′1τzi
(
γ0
))
. Let ς (θ1, γ, τ) ≡
E[s (yi, zi; θ1, τ, γ)]. By Lemma 6.1, ς (θ1, τ, γ) is continuous in (θ1, γ). It is straightfoward to show that
it is also continuous in τ. Thus ς (θ1, τ, γ) is continuous over Θ1 × T × Γ. By Lemma 2 in Galvao et
al. (2011), {s (y, z; θ1, γ, τ) : (θ1, τ, γ) ∈ Θ1 × T × Γ} is Glivenko-Cantelli. In conjunction with the
pointwise convergence, this implies that
sup
(θ1,τ,γ)∈Θ1×T ×Γ
∣∣S¯n (θ1, τ, γ)− ς (θ1, τ, γ)∣∣ p→ 0.
As remarked after Assumption A9, θ01 (τ, γ) = arg minθ1∈Θ1 ς (θ1, τ, γ) is uniquely defined. It follows
from Lemma B.1 of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) that
sup
(τ,γ)∈T ×Γ
∥∥∥θˆ1 (τ, γ)− θ01 (τ, γ)∥∥∥ = oP (1) . (6.14)
18It is easy to see that Hansen’s proofs of his Lemmas A.10-A.11 break down in the case a = 0.
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Let Dn (γ) ≡ Sˆnpi (γ)−
∑n
i=1
∫
ρτ
(
yi − θ0′1τzi
(
γ0
))
dΠ (τ) . (6.14) implies that uniformly over Γ
n−1Dn (γ) = n−1
n∑
i=1
∫
s
(
yi, zi; θˆ1 (τ, γ) , τ, γ
)
dΠ (τ)
= n−1
n∑
i=1
∫ [
ρτ
(
yi − θˆ1 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
− ρτ
(
yi − θ0′1τzi
(
γ0
))]
dΠ (τ)
= n−1
n∑
i=1
∫ [
ρτ
(
yi − θ01 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)− ρτ (yi − θ0′1τzi (γ0))] dΠ (τ) + oP (1)
= D (γ) + oP (1)
where D (γ) =
∫
E
[
ρτ
(
εiτ − (θ01 (τ, γ) zi (γ)− θ0′1τzi
(
γ0
)
)
)− ρτ (εiτ )] dΠ (τ) and εiτ = yi−θ0′1τzi (γ0) .
Again, by the fact that E [ρτ (εiτ − c)− ρτ (εiτ )] > 0 for all c 6= 0, D (γ) is minimized iff θ01 (τ, γ) zi (γ) =
θ0′1τzi
(
γ0
)
a.s., i.e., iff γ = γ0 by Assumption A9(ii). By invoking Lemma B.1 of Chernozhukov and
Hansen (2006) again, we have γˆ = γ0 + oP (1) . This, in conjunction with (6.14) and the continuity of
θ01 (τ, ·) , implies that θˆ1 (τ) = θˆ1 (τ, γˆ) = θ01 (τ, γˆ) + oP (1) = θ01τ + oP (1) .
(ii) By the computational property of quantile regression (e.g., Lemma A2 in Ruppert and Car-
roll (1980)), uniformly in (τ, γ) oP (1) = n
−1/2∑n
i=1 ψτ
(
yi − θˆ1 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
zi (γ) . For u = (y, z
′)′ ,
define the map f 7−→ Gnf (u) ≡ n−1/2
∑n
i=1{f (ui) − E [f (ui)]} for any measurable function f. Let
f1 (u; θ1, τ, γ) = ψτ (yi − θ1′z (γ)) z (γ) . Noting that {f1 (u; θ1, τ, γ) : (θ1, τ, γ) ∈ Θ1 × T × Γ} is Eu-
clidean and
E [f1 (ui; θ1 (τ, γ) , zi (γ) , γ)] = E
[
ψτ
(
yi − θ1 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
zi (γ)
]
= E
{[
F
(
θ01 (τ, γ)
′
zi (γ) |zi
)− F (θ1 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ) |zi)] zi (γ)}
→ −E [Ω¯1 (τ, γ)] (θ1 (τ, γ)− θ01 (τ, γ))
when θ1 (τ, γ)→ θ01 (τ, γ) uniformly in (τ, γ), we have
oP (1) = n
−1/2
n∑
i=1
ψτ
(
yi − θˆ1 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
zi (γ)
= Gnf1
(
ui; θˆ1 (τ, γ) , τ, γ
)
+
√
nE [f1 (ui; θ1, τ, γ)] |θ1=θˆ1(τ,γ)
= Gnf1
(
ui; θ
0
1 (τ, γ) , τ, γ
)
+ oP (1) +
√
nE [f1 (ui; θ1, τ, γ)] |θ1=θˆ1(τ,γ)
= Gnf1
(
ui; θ
0
1 (τ, γ) , τ, γ
)
+ oP (1)− Ω1 (τ, γ)
√
n
{
θˆ1 (τ, γ)− θ01 (τ, γ)
}
.
Thus we have the following uniform Bahadur representation
√
n
(
θˆ1 (τ, γ)− θ01 (τ, γ)
)
= Ω¯1 (τ, γ)
−1 1√
n
n∑
i=1
ψτ
(
yi − θ01 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)
)
zi (γ) + oP (1) , (6.15)
where we have used the fact E[ψτ (yi − θ01 (τ, γ)′ zi (γ)))|zi] = 0 by (3.18) and the last oP (1) holds
uniformly over T × Γ.
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(iii) Let w1 (τ) ≡
√
n
(
θ1τ − θ01τ
)
, w2 ≡ n1−2a
(
γ − γ0) , w1n (τ) ≡ √n(θˆ1τ − θ01τ ) and w2n ≡
n1−2a
(
γˆ − γ0) . Let {θ1τ} denote {θ1τ}τ∈T , and similarly for {θˆ1τ}. As in the proof of Theorems 3.4
and 3.5, we continue to use the decomposition for Dnτ (θ1τ , γ) in (6.4), where the only difference is
that γ and γ0 are now τ -invariant. Noting that
(
{θˆ1τ}, γˆ
)
=argmin{θ1τ},γ
∫
Dnτ (θ1τ , γ) dΠ (τ) , we
have
(w1n (·) , w2n) = argmin
w1(·), w2
[D1n (w1) + D¯2n (w1, w2)] .
where D1n (w1) =
∫
D1nτ (w1 (τ)) dΠ (τ) and D¯2n (w1, w2) =
∫
D¯2nτ (w1 (τ) , w2) dΠ (τ) . It is easy to
see that the results in Lemmata 6.2 and 6.3 can be strengthened to hold uniformly in (τ, w1) over any
compact set. It follows that
D1n (w1) = −n−1/2
∫
w1 (τ)
′
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0
)
ψτ (εiτ ) dΠ (τ)+
1
2
∫
w1 (τ)
′
Ω1τw1 (τ) dΠ (τ)+oP (1) , (6.16)
and
D¯2n (w1, w2) = D¯2n (0, w2)+oP (1) =
∫ n∑
i=1
[
ρτ
(
εiτ + δ
0′
τ ∆xi (w2)
)− ρτ (εiτ )] dΠ (τ)+oP (1) . (6.17)
Then the rest of the proof follows directly from the proof of Theorem 3.5 with obvious modification.
(iv) follows by the straightforward covariance calculations. 
Proof of Theorem 3.8.
(i) Let w2n ≡ n1−2a
(
γˆ − γ0) . Following closely the proof of Theorem 3.6, we obtain
LRn1
(
γ0
)
= −
∫
D¯2nτ (0, w2n) dΠ (τ) + oP (1) = −D¯2n (0, w2n) + oP (1) .
The result then follows by arguments analogous to those used in the proof of Theorem 3.6.
(ii) Let w¯1n (τ) = n
1/2
(
θˆ1
(
τ, γ0
)− θ01 (τ, γ0)) , w˜1n (τ) = n1/2 (θˆ1 (τ, γˆτ )− θ01 (τ, γ0)) , and w2n (τ) =
n1−2a
(
γˆτ − γ0
)
. By Theorems 3.7 and 3.5, w¯1n (τ) = OP (1) , w˜1n (τ) = Op(1), and w2n (τ) = Op(1).
Then by (6.4), (6.16), and (6.17), we have
LRn2
(
γ0
)
=
∫ [
Snτ
(
θˆ1
(
τ, γ0
)
, γ0
)
− Snτ
(
θˆ1
(
τ, γ0
)
, γˆτ
)]
dΠ (τ)
+
∫ [
Snτ
(
θˆ1
(
τ, γ0
)
, γˆτ
)
− Snτ
(
θˆ1 (τ, γˆτ ) , γˆτ
)]
dΠ (τ)
=
∫ [
D¯2nτ (w¯1n (τ) , 0)− D¯2nτ (w¯1n (τ) , w2n (τ))
]
dΠ (τ)
+
∫
[D¯1nτ (w¯1n (τ))− D¯1nτ (w˜1n (τ)) + D¯2nτ (w¯1n (τ) , w2n (τ))
− D¯2nτ (w˜1n (τ) , w2n (τ))]dΠ (τ)
= −
∫
D¯2nτ (0, w2n (τ)) dΠ (τ) +
∫ [
D¯1nτ (w¯1n (τ))− D¯1nτ (w˜1n (τ))
]
dΠ (τ) + oP (1)
≡ LRn2,1 + LRn2,2 + oP (1) , say.
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By (6.12), (6.13), and the CMT, under H0
LRn2,1 =
∫
LRnτ
(
γ0
)
dΠ (τ) + oP (1)
d→
∫
λτ
2µτ
dΠ (τ) sup
r
{
−1
2
|r|+W (r)
}
.
By Theorem 3.7(ii), w¯1n (τ) ⇒ Ω−11τ W
(
τ, γ0
)
. Then by the fact that n−1/2
∑n
i=1 zi
(
γ0
)
ψτ (εiτ ) ⇒
W
(
τ, γ0
)
, (6.16) and the CMT, we have∫
D¯1nτ (w¯1n (τ)) dΠ (τ)
= −n−1/2
∫
w¯1n (τ)
′
n∑
i=1
zi
(
γ0
)
ψτ (εiτ ) dΠ (τ) +
1
2
∫
w¯1n (τ)
′
Ω1τ w¯1n (τ) dΠ (τ) + oP (1)
d→ −1
2
∫
W
(
τ, γ0
)′
Ω−11τ W
(
τ, γ0
)
dΠ (τ) .
The same result holds for
∫
D¯1nτ (w˜1n (τ)) dΠ (τ) . As a consequence LRn2,2
d→ 0, implying that LRn2,2
= oP (1) . It follows that LRn2
(
γ0
) d→ ∫ λτ4µτ dΠ (τ) supr {− |r|+ 2W (r)} . 
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